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A Reminder:
The Constitutional Values of Sympathy
and Independence
BY ROBERT G. NATELSON*
ABSTRACT
A7'arly all participants in the American Founding shared constitu-
IY tional values of "sympathy" and "independence. "According to
the ideal of sympathy, government actors should mirror the full range of
popular attitudes. According to the ideal of independence, voters should
remain independent of other citizens and of governmental entities, and
those entities should remain independent of, and competitive with, each
other. Sympathy and independence were central, not peripheral, to the
Founders' Constitution, so the document cannot be interpreted properly
without keeping them in view. The author provides examples of how
constitutional practice might be altered had these central values not been
overlooked.'
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Repeatedly Referenced Works: The sources listed in this note are cited
repeatedly in this Article. Several may be unfamiliar to most legally-trained readers.
The editions used for these works are as follows:
JOHN ADAMS, A DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1787) (Only the first volume of this three volume set
had been published by the time of the Constitutional Convention, but the other two
followed quickly.).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
[The Constitution's] handful of general purposes will inform judicial
interpretation of many individual provisions that do not refer directly to
the general objective in question.2
INTRODUCTION
The language of the United States Constitution is not always clear,3 so
the principles and values underlying the document, to the extent they are
THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS (Morton Bordon ed., 1965) [hereinafter THE
ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS].
HENRY ST. JOHN BOLINGBROKE, THE WORKS OF LORD BOLINGBROKE (1967).
GILBERT CHINARD, HONEST JOHN ADAMS (1964).
JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1941).
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892).
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 196 1) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL-
IST].
JOHN FERLING, JOHN ADAMS: A LIFE (1992).
JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (J.G.A. Pocock ed.,
1992).
DAVID HUME'S POLITICAL ESSAYS (Charles W. Hendel ed., 1953).
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).
FORRESTMCDONALD, NOvuSORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUALORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION (1985).
BARON DEMONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRITOFTHE LAWS (Thomas Nugenttrans., rev 'd
by J.V. Pritchard, 1900).
Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum and
the Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807 (2002).
THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY (N.G.L. Hammond & H.H. Scullard eds.,
2d ed. 1970).
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Paul Leicester Ford
ed., 1888).
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS (1997).
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME, AND THE
AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1994).
COLLEEN A. SHEEHAN & GARY L. MCDOWELL, FRIENDS OF THE CONSTITUTION:
WRITINGS OF THE "OTHER" FEDERALISTS: 1787-1788 (1998).
HERBERTJ. STORING, THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: AN ABRIDGEMENT (Murray Dry ed.,
1981).
2 Stephen Breyer, Madison Lecture: Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 245, 247-48 (2002).
3 A concise discussion of the interpretative challenges appears in ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 15-16 (1997).
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discoverable,4 can be useful aids to interpretation. That originalists would
find them so should be obvious.5 But even many nonoriginalists may find
them useful. For example, advocates of the "living Constitution" seek to
apply the principles and values of the Constitution-perhaps even more
than the wording itself--to guide the evolution of constitutional law over
time.6
Those principles and values transcend the "intent of the drafters." The
relevant evidence of original understanding includes the views of all or
most participants in the great Constitutional debate of 1787-1789. The
Constitution was a political deal, and, as in other deals, there was more than
one side. Essentially, the process was one of public negotiation: Congress
authorized the convention, the members of the convention argued among
themselves and most finally agreed on the content of an offer: the proposed
Constitution. In each state, the public debated on whether to ratify (i.e.,
whether to accept the offer). Although we cannot recapture much of what
was said privately, a great deal was said publicly-in newspapers,
pamphlets, broadsides, and the state ratifying conventions--and much or
most of that has been preserved.
As the debate came to a head in 1788, it became clear that the Anti-
Federalists might be able to block ratification in pivotal states such as New
York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, whose assent was necessary to the
scheme. The Anti-Federalists had drawn blood by pointing out purported
defects in the document such as the vague nature of the General Welfare
Clause7 and the lack of a bill of rights. In the face of Anti-Federalist gains,
the Federalists naturally sought to reassure the faithful, win undecided
Justice Jackson stated, "Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have
envisioned had they foreseen modem conditions, must be divined from materials
almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for
Pharaoh." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring). This is no doubt true as to some principles and values but
not, as shown in this Article, of the values of sympathy and independence
discussed here. Cf. RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 7 (asserting that Jackson overstated
his point).
' For a discussion of the differences between originalists and nonoriginalists,
see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 3, at 17-20.
6 A critical but useful summary of the arguments of the "living Constitution"
theorists appears in Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species:
The "Living Constitution, " The Third Amendment, and The Endangered Species
Act, 30 ENVTL. L. 769 (2000). See also id. at 773 ("The Constitution must be
interpreted to give effect to the principles expressed in the text in the context of
contemporary social and political problems.").
7 U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 1.
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voters, and persuade or neutralize moderate Anti-Federalists. Accordingly,
proponents issued reassuring representations about the meaning of the
document8 and, ultimately, acceded to the demand for a bill of rights. They
also showed how the document furthered the values and principles shared
by Federalists and Anti-Federalists. These dynamics in the ratification
debate underscore why the stated views of participants on both sides in the
Founding Generation are relevant sources of common principles.'
On some basic constitutional values there was little variation of
thought. Federalists thought that, on balance, the Constitution would
promote certain values while the Anti-Federalist thought that it would not.
However, they agreed on the fundamental political principles that the
eventual frame of government should promote. Among the principles upon
which almost everyone agreed was republicanism- -consisting at a
minimum of a non-monarchical government that institutionalized the rule
of law, and as to most matters rule by a majority of voting citizens.'" Other
principles almost universally held were a wide citizen franchise (i.e.,
avoidance of aristocracy)," political liberty, some sort of federalism, 2 and
the two values discussed in this Article: sympathy and independence.
Some of these principles have received a great deal of scholarly and
judicial attention, but, at least in recent scholarship, the values of sympathy
8 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 1, at 263-64 (James Madison)
(reassuring the public of the narrow scope of the General Welfare Clause).
9 Professor Rakove has characterized the process as one of "determining which
forms of republican government were best suited to securing the general principles
all accepted." RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 19.
I do not dispute that some views are more relevant than others. For example, the
views of Alexander Hamilton, which were near the edge of the political spectrum,
compare CHINARD, supra note 1, at 238 (Hamilton expressing his preference for
the British form of government), are probably less representative than those of an
elected official such as Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia. Relevance also
can be divined by the centrality of the role the specific actor played. However, such
issues of relative importance are not weighed in this Article, since practically all
participants shared the two values discussed here.
" On the minimal agreed content of the Founding Generation's republicanism,
see Natelson, supra note 1, at 822-23 (stating that "republicanism" included
majority rule, the rule of law, and absence of a monarch).
"Id. at 827 (noting that the Founders were divided on whether aristocracy was
inconsistent with republicanism, but that titles of nobility were prohibited by U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10).
12 George Read of Delaware was almost the only Founder to propose abolishing
the states. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1,
at 136.
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and independence have been comparatively neglected. Sympathy has hardly
been discussed at all. Independence appears mostly in articles about
judicial independence," although judicial independence was only one
phrase in a complex melody. 4
Without understanding the roles of sympathy and independence, our
interpretation of the Constitution is distorted. Sympathy and independence
are not peripheral to the document, but central to it. The goals of this
Article are to remind the legal community of what the values of sympathy
and independence are, to show that these values affected the drafting and
ratification of the Constitution, and to offer some examples of how proper
13 Thus, Illinois Supreme Court Justice Heiple has observed:
As every American schoolchild learns, governments in this country are
composed of three separate branches. In spite of this, one rarely hears talk
of "legislative independence" or "executive independence." Yet the need
for judicial independence is a common subject of legal, political, and
academic discourse ....
James D. Heiple, Introduction, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 661, 661-62 (1997).
The same observation was made earlier in James Zagel & Adam Winder,
Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: The Independence of Judges, 46
MERCER L. REV. 795, 814 (1995).
For recent treatments ofjudicial independence, see John Ferejohn, Independent
Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L.
REV. 353 (1999); Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The
Independence of the Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
31 (1998); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Discipline, Judicial Independence, and the
Constitution: A Textual and Stuctural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673 (1999);
BurkeleyN. Riggs & Tamera D. Westerberg, Judicial Independence: An Historical
Perspective, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 337 (1997).
'4 There have been a few recent writings on specific aspects of executive and
legislative independence. See, e.g., Laura Krugman Ray, Discipline Through
Delegation: Solving the Problem of Congressional Housecleaning, 55 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 389 (1994) (arguing that the Speech or Debate Clause promotes legislative
independence); Steven N. Sherr, Freedom and Federalism: The FirstAmendment's
Protection of Legislative Voting, 101 YALE. L.J. 233 (1991) (noting that congres-
sional conditions on grants to states may trigger First Amendment issues because
they interfere with the independence of state legislatures); Douglas S. Onley, Note,
Treading on Sacred Ground: Congress's Power to Subject White House Advisers
to Senate Confirmation, 37 WM. & MARY. L.. REV. 1183 (1996) (discussing
executive independence); J. Robert Robertson, Comment, The Effects of Consent
Decrees on Local LegislativeImmunity, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1121 (1989) (arguing
that legislative immunity promotes legislative independence); Michael.R. Seghetti,
Note, Speech or Debate Immunity: Preserving Legislative Independence While
Cutting Costs of Congressional Immunity, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 589 (1985).
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consideration of these values might alter current Constitutional interpreta-
tion and practice.
I. SYMPATHY
A. The Founding Generation's Passion for Sympathy
1. The Meaning and Importance of Sympathy
In modern American usage, or at least in my interpretative community,
"sympathy" lies somewhere between empathy and pity-more condescend-
ing than the former, less so than the latter. Among the Founding Generation
the meaning was closer to empathy. In the political context, sympathy
meant a kind of similarity between officials and the people they gov-
erned-specifically, an identity of feelings, views, interests, opinions,
senses, habits, and sentiments."5 James Madison used the term "fellow-
feeling" as a synonym for sympathy.'6 John Adams's ideal was a govern-
ment "in Miniature, an exact Portrait of the people at large." 7
Although we do not hear much about the subject today, the Founding
Generation placed sympathy between people and government among their
highest political values. As we shall see, much of the debate surrounding
the Constitution involved the question of whether the document would
ensure adequate sympathy between government and governed.
15 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 1, at 352 (James Madison)
(referring to "that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments"); Federal
Farmer, Letter No. 3, in STORING, supra note 1, at 51 ("feelings, views, and
interests"); Federal Farmer, Letter No. 7, id. at 77 ("interests, . . . opinions, and
views"); Brutus, No. 3, id. at 125 (sentiments, feelings, interests); The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their
Constituents, id. at 214; Federal Farmer, No. 76-77, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 217 ("habits, feelings, and opinions"); cf Agrippa, Letter No. 1,
in STORING, supra note 1, at 230 ("affection for the welfare of the people."
Arguably, however, this last may be slightly different from sympathy. One can be
concerned with another's welfare without sharing that person's sentiments and
views.).
On the value the Founding Generation placed on sympathy, see also RAKOVE,
supra note 1, at 203-04.
163 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 395, Samuel Johnson's dictionary agreed, defining
"sympathy" as "fellow feeling; mutual sensibility; the quality of being affected by
the affection of another." There is no entry in the dictionary for "empathy."
JOHNSON, supra note 1.
17 FERLING, supra note 1, at 214.
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2. Reasons For Sympathetic Government
The Founding Generation had several reasons for believing that to be
good, government must be sympathetic. One reason is that they were all
republicans, and they believed that popular control of government was of
the essence for republicanism. Res publica res est populi, John Adams
said, 8 quoting Cicero: a republic is the property of the people. James
Harrington, the influential English political writer of Cromwell's time,
compared government decisions in a commonwealth (republic) to decisions
on allocating portions of cake: one participant must divide, the other
chooses. It was best if the Senate divided (discussed), but the people made
the final choice, 9 for, after all, the commonwealth was their property.20 It
follows from this view that public affairs should be administered as a trust
for the people.2' Trustees (government actors) are more likely to honor their
obligations if bound to their beneficiaries (the people) by ties of sympathy.
A related reason the Founding Generation insisted on sympathetic
government is that they were zealous for the liberties they had won, and
they believed that continuation of those liberties depended on creating a
government in which "the interest of the members is the same as yours [i.e.,
the people's]. 22 In monarchies and aristocracies, by contrast, those in
38 1 ADAMS, supra note 1, at xxi.
'9 HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 24 ("Dividing and choosing, in the language
of a commonwealth, is debating and resolving; and whatsoever upon debate of the
senate, is proposed unto the people, and resolved by them, is enacted auctoritate
patrum etjussu populi, by the authority of the fathers [i.e., the senators] and the
power of the people, which concurring make a law.").
20 Id. at 12 ("And if the whole people be landlords, or hold the lands so divided
among them, that no one man, or number of men, within the compass of the few or
aristocracy, overbalance them, the empire. . . is a commonwealth.").
2 The Federalist Papers, for example, include many references to the "public
trust." See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 1, at 316 (James Madison);
id. No. 55, at 345; id. No. 57, at 350; id. No. 63, at 383.
22 ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING
ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 225 (Roger Sherman
writing as "A Countryman"). The connection between the trust duties of governors
and the preservation of liberty is illustrated in THE FEDERALIST No. 49:
The members of the legislative department, on the other hand, are numer-
ous. They are distributed and dwell among the people at large. Their
connections of blood, of friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great
proportion of the most influential part of the society. The nature of their
public trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that they are
more immediately the confidential guardians of the rights and liberties of
the people.
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power governed for their own interest, with adverse effects on liberty for
the citizenry as a whole."
Another reason for sympathetic government was that, in general,
decisions by- officials remote from popular feeling-even if well-
intentioned-would not be of as high a quality as decisions by officials in
touch, with the broad mass of citizens. Contact with the citizenry would
provide more information and many points of view. In other words, with
some qualifications, the Founders seem to have agreed with Aristotle24 and
the Bible25 that more decision makers were better than fewer. Federalist
John Jay made the point:
It is said that "in a multitude-of counsellors there is safety," because
in the first place, there is greater security for probity; and in the next, if
every member cast in 'only his mite of information and argument, their
joint stock of both will thereby become greater than the stock possessed
by any one single man out of doors [i.e., in public life].26
Anti-Federalists expressed similar opinions. For example, Melancton
Smith, Hamilton's great antagonist in the New York ratifying convention,
THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 1, at 316 (James Madison).23Infra note 34.
24ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 202-03 & 222 (Thomas Alan Sinclair trans., rev 'd
1992). For Aristotle's influence on the Founding Generation, see, for example,
RICHARD, supra note 1, at 125 & 133 (mixed government), 169-70 (natural law).
I have discussed Aristotle's influence on James Madison's use of the term "pure
democracy" in Natelson, supra note 1.
23 Proverbs 11:14 ("in the multitude of counselors there is safety").
26 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
75. Cf 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at
134 (Madison stating that direct election of representatives by the people will lead
to better quality representatives); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 40 (Noah Webster, defending the small size of the
Senate on the grounds that they will be under the direction of the state legislatures);
id. at 329 (George Mason claiming that the Constitution's House of Representa-
tives was only the "shadow of representation," and would possess inadequate
information).
The phrase "out of doors" as meaning "in public life" is one of those many
eighteenth century expressions hard to understand for those without the Founding
Generation's knowledge of Latin. (The wordforensic derives from the Latinforas,
which means outdoors, related in turn to forum.) On the close connection between
Latin and the political discourse of the Founding Generation, see Natelson, supra
note 1, and the sources cited therein.
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argued that a larger, more sympatheticlegislature would be more fiscally
responsible than a legislature drawing its members from only one part of
society.27
The idea that more decision makers leads to better decisions was not
inconsistent with the Founder's preference for representative over direct
democracy-the latter in their time necessarily signifying mass meetings
in the town square. John Dickinson argued that representation "collects the
will of millions upon points concerning their welfare, with more advantage,
than the will of hundreds could be collected under the ancient form. 28
Yet another reason for sympathetic government was that it would be
more durable than its opposite. A tree with roots planted firmly among the
people could withstand strong blasts indeed.29 Early in the federal
convention, Pennsylvania Delegate James Wilson, contending that
representatives should be elected directly by the people, supported his
position with another metaphor:
Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous
branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising
the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished
to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist
27 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 244. See also Smith's comments:
We ought to guard against the govemment being placed in the hands of
this [upper] class. They cannot have that sympathy with their constituents
which is necessary to connect them closely to their interests. Being in the
habit of profuse living, they will be profuse in the public expenses. They
find no difficulty in paying their taxes, and therefore do not feel public
burdens. Besides, if they govern, they will enjoy the emoluments of the
government. The middling class, from their frugal habits, and feeling
themselves the public burdens, will be careful how they increase them.
Id. at 248.
2 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
206.
29 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 1, at 290 (James Madison) (stating
if local sovereigns under feudalism had been in sympathy with the people, Europe
would have become a continent of petty sovereignties); id., No. 63, at 390 (James
Madison) (writing, "Against the force of the immediate representatives of the
people nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the
Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good,
as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the
entire body of the people themselves."); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 129 (James
Iredell, at the North Carolina ratifying convention, speaking of the power of the
popular branch).
2002-2003]
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without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this
confidence was peculiarly essential.3°
3. All Parts of Government Should Be Sympathetic
Discussions of sympathy arose most often in debates over the proposed
federal House of Representatives. But sympathy was also a virtue for the
other branches of government, both state and federal.3' Patrick Henryjustifled
state jurisdiction over its own inhabitants because states were more sympa-
thetic to those inhabitants than federal government would be.32 Madison
argued that the President would "be considered as a national officer, acting
for and equally sympathising with every part of the U. States [sic]."33 The
Upper House in Britain was composed of aristocrats, independent of the
people,34 but the Federalists argued that under the new Constitution the Upper
House would be composed of ordinary citizens, sympathetic with, and
ultimately dependent upon the people.35 Even the courts, the most remote of
all the branches, were ultimately responsible to the people,36 and the jury
30 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 49.
3 For a discussion of sympathy in the House and how it differed from sympathy
in the other branches of government, see infra Parts I.C and II.D.
32 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 590. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 3 1, supra note
1, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the closely-allied concept of depend-
ence at the state level); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 47 (Fisher Ames speaking at the
Massachusetts ratifying convention).
33 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 81.
Cf 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 388 (James Monroe at the Virginia ratifying
convention stated: "He ought to depend on the people of America for his
appointment and continuance in office; he ought also to be responsible, in an equal
degree, to all the states .. ").
34 Generally, aristocrats were seen as independent of, rather than dependent, on
the people. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 256 (Hamilton at the New York ratifying
convention); SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 347 (a Federalist "Cato").
3 THE FEDERALISTNO. 63, supra note 1, at 389 (James Madison); PAMPHLETS
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 35 & 38 (Noah
Webster stating that the Senate was not to represent a higher order, but to be
dependent on the people); SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 351-52 ("A
Democratic Federalist" opining that the Senate, unlike the British House of Lords,
will not be a different class, but will have no "interest different from and separate
from the people").
36 See, e.g., Brutus, Nos. 15 & 16, in STORING, supra note 1, at 103-91
(criticizing the proposed Constitution for making the judges too independent of the
people); 3 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 420 ("So the people are represented in courts
of justice by the judges and the juries...").
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system would inject into their deliberations the ideas and attitudes of the
common man.
37
B. Threats to Sympathetic Government
The Founders identified the principal threat to a sympathetic republic
as capture by special interests--or,, to use the economic term, rent-
seekers:38 individuals and groups who seek to use government power to
profit in ways deleterious to the public.39 The most common contemporary
terms for special interests were factions, combinations, and juntos.40 Even
an unscrupulous majority could comprise a faction.4' Usually, however,
factions were minorities. The risk was that they might form a coalition to
create a majority and adopt measures that benefited that majority but
41,damaged the whole.
37 The Federal Farmer, No. 4, in STORING, supra note 1, at 58-59. See also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 83, supra note 1, at 500-01 (Alexander Hamilton, citing the jury
as a protection against "corruption").
38 Economic rent is "income in excess of opportunity cost." RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178 n.4 (3d ed. 1986). Rent-seeking is a
competitive activity in which expected gains ultimately are translated into wider
costs. Id. at 35 n.3.
39 Cf 3 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 273 (apparently adopting Nedham's definition
of faction: "an adherence to an interest distinct from the true interest of the state").
40 The frequency of the use of these terms is captured somewhat by. the
following: In THE FEDERALIST, supra note 1, the term "faction" is used in this
sense fifty-four times, "combination" thirty-one times, and "junto"--more of an
anti-federalist term--once. In THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, an
edited compilation of some of the best anti-federalist productions (but about
twenty-nine percent shorter than THE FEDERALIST), "combination" appears eleven
times, "faction" twelve, and "junto" six times. These figures are approximate,
because sometimes they (especially "combination") may be used in a different or
overlapping sense.
My personal observation is that publications less high-toned employed these
terms of opprobrium more frequently.
4' 3 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 287 ("It may sound oddly [sic] to say that the
majority is a faction; but it is, nevertheless, literally just. If the majority are partial
in their own favour, if they refuse or deny [sic: should be "grant"] a perfect
equality to every member of the minority, they are a faction....").
42 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 80 (James Madison).
The following illustrates how a measure might benefit the majority but damage
the whole: A society with an aggregate wealth of $1000 contains ten special
interests, each worth $100. Six special interests form a majority to pass legislation
that raises the wealth of each of the six to $120, or an aggregate of $720, while
2002-2003]
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Corruption, oppression, and undue influence were contemporary terms
used to describe the result of government officials disregarding the public
good by serving factions, combinations, or juntos 3 Corruption did not
necessarily signify personal dishonesty. It was more akin to the breach of
trust that occurs when a private trustee favors one beneficiary over
another--that is, a breach of the duty of impartiality."' The factions thus
benefited might not be domestic. An unsympathetic legislature45 or
executive branch46 was good feeding ground for foreign interests. Corrup-
tion was a disease to which monarchy and aristocracy were particularly
susceptible because, by definition, in monarchies and aristocracies
governmental decision makers were relatively few and were independent
reducing the wealth of the other four from an aggregate of $400 to $200. The six
factions have benefitted, but not only has each of the four groups outside the
combination suffered, but total societal wealth has dropped from $1000 to
$920.
4 For examples of the use of the term "corruption," see THE ANTIFEDERALIST
No. 3, supra note 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 1, at 82. For an example
of the term "oppression," see id. at 83. For an example of the term "undue
influence," see THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 1, at 40.
44 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts states, "Duty to Deal Impartially with
Beneficiaries. When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is
under a duty to deal impartially with them." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 183 (1959).
The Anti-Federalist writer "Agrippa" (probably James Winthop) captured the
attitude: "On the contrary I believe that it is universally true, that acts made to
favour a part of the community are wrong in principle." Agrippa, No. 3, in
STORING, supra note 1, at 232-33. Cf 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 491 (James
Wilson, at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, stating, "Impartiality is the
leading feature in this Constitution; it pervades the whole."). See also ESSAYS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY
THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 275-76 (George Clinton writing as
"Cato," stating that Senate must be independent of the President to assure
impartiality); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 1, at 36 (Noah Webster praising impartiality in the executive and judiciary);
id. at 41 (impartiality in the Senate); id. at 77 (John Jay stating that public officials
"are to receive that [public] business to manage, not for themselves and as their
own, but as agents and overseers for the people to whom they, are constantly
responsible.").
45 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at451-
52 (James Madison). ,
46 2 id. at 389 (Charles Pinkney speaking at the federal convention); 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 490 (James Monroe speaking at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion).
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of the people at large,47 most of whom, indeed, depended on the few who
dominated the government.4 . However, a broad-based, sympathetic
government would mirror all the major interests and attitudes of the general
population. Since all would have a voice, such a government would be less
subject to corruption.49
C. Securing Sympathetic Government
1. The Problem
A principal problem for the Founders was how best to ensure that
government remained sympathetic. They devoted much energy to learning
and applying lessons from the history of previous republics, a task in which
their classical educations aided them greatly. By the time of the federal
convention, John Adams had collected much republican history in the first
volume of his Defence of the Constitutions of the United States. (The
"constitutions" thereby referenced were the existing state constitutions.).
Participants in the debate of 1787-1789 repeatedly cited and relied upon
this work. 0
Educated people in the Founding Generation knew how sympathy, to
the extent desired by ancient constitution-makers, had been assured in
ancient republics: by choosing magistrates through direct election or by lot,
47 3 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 374 (writing that free states are generally less
subject to oppression and tyranny than are aristocracies or monarchies, although
free states without checks are also subject to oppression and tyranny); 2 ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 105 (Fisher Ames stating that dependence on the people is a
protection against aristocracy); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 1, at 451 (Madison stating, "In Monarchies and Aristocracies
oppression proceeds from a want of sympathy & responsibility in the Govt. towards
the people."); 2 id. at 30 (James Wilson stating that Polish nobles' dependence
threatens their "republic").
4' PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
212 (John Dickinson writing as "Fabius"); SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1,
at 48-49 (Nicholas Collins writing as "A Foreign Spectator").
49 Some saw the proposed federal legislature as not sympathetic enough, and
therefore prone to corruption. See, e.g., THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 21,
supra note 1, at 53 ("Centinel") ("In short, by putting it in the power of the future
government to levy money at pleasure, and placing this government so independent
of the people as to enable the administration to gratify every corrupt passion of the
mind, to riot on your spoils, without check or control?").
50 For a discussion of the influence of this text, see Natelson, supra note 1.
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by indirectly electing senators,5 and by instituting popular assemblies in
which the citizenry gathered to discuss, approve, or reject proposals.52
The drafters of the American state and federal constitutions replicated
ancient republics' direct and indirect election of magistrates and senators,
but not their popular assemblies. They concluded that the popular
assemblies suffered from serious flaws53 and that the sheer size of America
rendered it impractical to collect all citizens of a state or nation in one
place.54 Hence, each state had a legislature based on a "scheme of repre-
sentation as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person."55 At the
"' In the Roman Republic, for example, all elected magistrates of the rank of
quaestor secured life tenure in the senate, and "[tihus the senate was recruited
indirectly by popular election." THE OXFORD CLASSICAL DICTIONARY, supra note
1, at 973.
This Article uses the term "magistrate" in its traditional republican sense of any
public officeholder other than a legislator.
52 For some ancient popular assemblies, see id. at 208 (Carthage); id. at 272
(Rome); id. at 376-77 (Athens). All of these republics, as well as that of Sparta,
were discussed prominently in the founding debates. See Natelson, supra note
1.
13 E.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 8 (Fisher Ames, at the Massachusetts
ratifying convention); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 1, at 30 (Noah Webster). But see A Farmer, No. 5, in STORING,
supra note 1, at 267-70 (an Anti-Federalist, probably John Francis Mercer of
Maryland, who favored retention of popular assemblies as they existed in
Switzerland).
54 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 8 (Fisher Ames speaking at the Massachusetts
ratifying convention); ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at
151 (Oliver Ellsworth writing as "A Landholder"); id. at 269 (George Clinton
writing as "Cato"); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 1, at 30 (Noah Webster); SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 346
(a Federalist "Cato").
At the local level, matters were different, and the popular assembly was
replicated in the New England town meeting.
55 THE FEDERALIST No. 52, supra note 1, at 327 (James Madison). See also 3
ADAMS, supra note 1, at 214; The Federal Farmer, No. 7, in STORING, supra note
1, at 74; PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1,
at 30 (Noah Webster). Cf HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 24 ("[Alnd whereas this,
in case the commonwealth consist of an [sic] whole nation, is too unwieldy a body
to be assembled, this council is to consist of such a representative as may be equal,
and so constituted as can never contract any other interest than that of the whole
people .... ).
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federal level, the proposed Constitution would replace the republican
popular assembly with a House of Representatives. 6
However, operating through representatives rather than directly entails
"agency costs.""7 One of these costs is the risk that the representative will
act at cross-purposes to, or at least not in full sympathy with, the
principal." Thus, drafters of the new constitution had to structure the
House of Representatives in a manner that would reduce the risk that it
might betray the people; they then had to defend their proposal against
Anti-Federalist charges that they had done an inadequate job.
2. One Solution: A Sympathetic Congress as Guardian
In discussions of how to render government sympathetic, most of the
focus was on the new national legislature--partly the Senate,59 but
particularly the House of Representatives, the replacement for the popular
56 THE FEDERALIST No. 52, supra note 1, at 327 (James Madison) (stating,"As
it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common
interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under
consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy
with, the people."); The Federal Farmer, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 76-77,
supra note 1, at 217 ("A legislature, in a free country, must be numerous; it is in
some degree a periodical assemblage of the people, frequently formed.").
Cf SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 171 (Noah Webster writing, "The
Legislators thus chosen to represent the people, should have all the power that the
people would have, were they assembled in one body to deliberate upon public
measures.").
37 Agency costs are "the costs to the principal of obtaining faithful and effective
performance by his agents." POSNER, supra note 38, at 368.
5' At the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Fisher Ames characterized the
"agency cost" objection as follows:
Much has been said about the people divesting themselves of power,
when they delegate it to representatives; and that all representation is to
their disadvantage, because it is but an image, a copy, fainter and more
imperfect than the original, the people, in whom the light of power is
primary and unborrowed, which is only reflected by their delegates. I cannot
agree to either of these opinions.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 8.
59 E.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 40 (Noah Webster, defending the Senate as sufficiently representative despite
its small size because of its direction by state legislatures); id. at 42 ("But the
senate of the United States can have no separate interests from the body of the
people .... "). See also id. at 140 (Tench Coxe); infra note 99 and accompanying
text.
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assemblies of old. Nearly everyone on both sides of the debate agreed with
the paramount importance of sympathy in the House. Thus, Federalist
James Madison commented:
It was politic as well as just that the interests & rights of every class
should be duly represented & understood in the public Councils. It was
a provision every where established that the Country should be divided
into districts & representatives taken from each, in order that the
Legislative Assembly might equally understand & sympathise, with the
rights of the people in every part of the Community. It was not less proper
that every class of Citizens should have an opportunity of making their
rights be felt & understood in the public Councils.
60
Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith stated:
The idea that naturally suggests itself to our minds, when we speak of
representatives, is, that they resemble those they represent. They should
be a true picture of the people, possess a knowledge of their circum-
stances and their wants, sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed
to seek their true interests.
61
60 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 123-
24.
This view of Madison tends to get lost in discussions of his theories of
"refinement" and "filtration" of popular views. At the federal convention, Madison
himself put matters in perspective:
Mr. Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the
national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He
observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was
composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body
of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be
elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first--the
Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments
again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be
lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their
rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of
refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it
might be pushed too far.
l id. at 49-50. See also 1 id. at 57 (Pierce, quoting Madison: "Mr. Maddison [sic]
was of the opinion that the appointment of the Members to the first branch of the
national Legislature ought to be made by the people for two reasons,--one was that
it would inspire confidence, and the other that it would induce the Government to
sympathize with the people.").
61 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 245 (speaking at the New York ratifying con-
vention).
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There are similar words preserved for us from throughout the debates.
They were uttered by Federalists62 and Anti-Federalists63 alike. Dissenters
were few,' although Alexander Hamilton, the great outlier in the debate
who labored mightily but unsuccessfully to conceal his monarchical
views,'. doubted whether the ideal was capable of realization.'
To keep the House sympathetic, most people thought that representa-
tive districts should be relatively small and representatives relatively
numerous.67 Thiswould promote sympathy in two ways. Smaller districts
62 E.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 279 (William Grayson at the Virginia
ratifying convention stating that the purpose of the House is to provide full and fair
representation); ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 152 (Oliver
Ellsworth, writing as "The Landholder," stating that the Congress "will always
know the sense of the people at large" by reason of Congressmen's "acquaintance
with their own state legislatures."); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 170 (John Dickinson writing as "Fabius").
63 For example, in speaking of the House of Representatives, George Mason
said (as reported by Madison), "It was, so to speak, to be our House of Com-
mons-It ought to know & sympathise with every part of the community." 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 48. And again:
"The requisites in actual representation are that the Reps. should sympathize with
their constituents; shd. think as they think, & feel as they feel.. . ." lid. at 133-34.
See also PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1,
at 288 (Richard Henry Lee writing as "The Federal Farmer").
"One was "Cato," a Federalist who objected to proportional representation for
"fools and knaves." SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 347.
65 CHINARD, supra note 1, at 238 (Hamilton expressing his preference for the
British system).
66 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 1, at 215-16 (Alexander Hamilton)
(questioning the extent to which the House could mirror all interests and argued
that virtual representation, whereby some classes represented the interests of other
classes, was sufficient). One can argue that Fisher Ames took a similar view. 2
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 11.
67E.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 12 (Wilson Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying
convention: "[F]or the more the representatives increase in number, the greater the
influence of the people in the government... ." Nicholas did, however, defend the
relatively small size of the House. 3 Id.).
This was an area in which the Federalists were on the defensive. They did the
best they could. Hamilton argued that small districts could be less representative
because they could be dominated by a few great men and their dependents. 2 id. at
256-57 (at the New York ratifying convention), but he was almost the only person
to do so. See also 3 id. at I I 1 (Francis Corbin at the Virginia ratifying convention);
3 id. at 256-57 (Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention).
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assured that all important pockets of society had a voice and that none
would be disregarded simply because they were unrepresented. 6' When
Federalists raised the rather lame counter that a small House would be
cheaper to maintain, New York's Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith took
them head on by arguing:
The difference of expense, between supporting a House of Representa-
tives sufficiently numerous, and the present proposed one, would be
twenty or thirty thousand dollars per annum. The man who would
seriously object to this expense, to secure his liberties, does not deserve
to enjoy them. Besides, by increasing the number of representatives, we
open a door for the admission of the substantial yeomanry of our country,
who, being possessed of the habits of economy, will be cautious of
imprudent expenditures, by which means a greater saving will be made of
public money than is sufficient to support them.69
Larger legislatures were also seen as more sympathetic because
numerosity raised the costs of "combination." Larger chambers were less
subject to "corruption"--including corruption by foreign interests ° or by
the Senate =-because majorities were more difficult to purchase. Anti-
Federalists such as Richard Henry Lee hammered home the risks of small
chambers:
I mean the constant liability of a small number of representatives to
private combinations. The tyranny of the one, or the licentiousness of the
Federalist John Dickinson was at first uncertain about the advantages of
numerosity, PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
l, at 169, but shortly thereafter seemed to concede its desirability. Id. at 170.
68 E.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 295 (small size of House would keep out men of humbler classes). Cf Noah
Webster's defense of the small size of the Senate on the basis that it would be
subject to "direction" by numerous state legislators. Id. at 40.
69 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 244. Smith claimed that the insufficient size of the
House was a point of union among all Anti-Federalists. PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 102.
7 0 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 249 (Melancton Smith speaking at the New York
ratifying convention); 2 id. at 261 (John Lansing speaking at the same convention);
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 268
(Edmund Randolph claiming the small number of states in the confederation
congress increased the opportunities for foreign influence).
7' ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING
ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 273 (George Clinton
writing as "Cato").
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multitude, are, in my mind, but small evils, compared with the factions of
the few. It is a consideration well worth pursuing, how far this house of
representatives will be liable to be formed into private juntos .... 72
Madison agreed that a certain level of numerosity was needed to deter
"corruption."73 Even the arch-Federalist, Hamilton, conceded the point,
stating explicitly that numerosity would "make it as difficult as possible for
[legislators] to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public
good. 7' The value, incidentally, of numerosity in combating special
interest influence has been confirmed by modem academic research. 75
The problem this widespread belief presented for the Federalists is that
the federal convention had made the tactical blunder of providing for a
relatively small initial house--one representative for every 30,000 people.
Indeed, it almost was one for every 40,000, but on the last day of the
convention George Washington spoke up-his only recorded contribu-
tion to the debate--and convinced the delegates to enlarge the lower
72 THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS No. 55 part 1, supra note 1, at 162.
See also id. No. 76-77, at 217 (also as "The Federal Farmer," Richard Henry
Lee, stating, "A legislature, in a free country, must be numerous."); id. No. 63, part
2, at 186 (The Federal Farmer stating, "But in a government consisting of but a few
members, elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation of the
people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among the
members. They become in some measure a fixed body, and often inattentive to the
public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corruption."); 2 ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 248 (Melancton Smith stating, "In so small a number of representatives,
there is great danger from corruption and combination.").
See also ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 54
("Agrippa"); id. at 268-69 (George Clinton writing as "Cato"); The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their
Constituents, in STORING, supra note 1, at 214.73 See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
1, at 536. Compare l id. at 136 with THE FEDERALISTNO. 10, supra note 1, at 83
(in each case, James Madison stating that a remedy for faction is to increase the
number of players). David Hume had pointed out that personal factions arise more
easily in smaller than in larger republics. HUME, supra note 1, at 78.
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 66, supra note 1, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton). Cf
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 143
(Tench Coxe noting that widespread suffrage among thousands of independent
freemen would prevent electoral bribery).
75 ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION,
AND THE ECONOMY 29-60 (1981) (finding inverse correlations between state
special interest legislation and size of state legislatures).
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house.76 Still, even in districts with 30,000 population, each representative
would be chosen by five or six thousand electors," and those were large
numbers in that era. So it was on this issue that the Anti-Federalists made
some of their most telling arguments.7"
In general, the Federalist responses to Anti-Federalist charges of
insufficient numerosity were as weak as the cost argument answered so
effectively by Melancton Smith.79 Among the Federalist defenses were
pleas that the Constitution's drafters had done the best they could, 0 that
numerosity would increase corruption," that with the rise in population the
House would get larger, 2 and that "fools and knaves" should not get
proportional representation in any event.8 3 Ultimately, the Constitution may
have been saved because everyone agreed that the question of how many
legislators were "enough" was not subject to mathematical determination. 4
76 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 644
(Washington called the small House "insufficient security for the rights & interests
of the people."). By this stand the "American Cincinnatus" may have saved the
Constitution from popular rejection.
77 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 1, at 354 (James Madison).
78 E.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 289,303 (Richard Henry Lee, writing as "A Federal Farmer," claims Congress
should contain at least 200 members); Centinel, Letter No. 1, in STORING, supra
note 1, at 19; The Federal Farmer, Letter No. 3, id. at 44, 47, 51; The Federal
Farmer, Letter No. 7, id. at 77-78; Brutus, No. 3, id. at 125; Brutus, No. 4, id. at
127-29; The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, id. at 214; Agrippa, Letter No. 1, id. at 230.
79 Supra note 69 and accompanying text.
80 E.g., SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 337 ("Atticus" writing that
"[a]s to the representation, it seems to be as large, as the state of our country will
well admit of; and as well defined, as numbers can make it.").
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 1, at 360 (James Madison) (arguing that
a House of too large a number could be counterproductive); SHEEHAN &
MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 42 ("A Federalist" arguing the same).
82 E.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 11 (Wilson Nicholas, at the Virginia ratifying
convention, stating, "I take it for granted that the number of representatives will be
increased, according to the progressive increase of population, at every respective
enumeration; and one for every thirty thousand will amount to one hundred
representatives . ").
83 SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 347 ("Cato," a Federalist arguing
against equal representation for "fools and knaves").
84 See 2 ELLIOT, supra note' 1, at 245 (Melancton Smith stating, "We may be
sure that ten is too small, and a thousand too large a number. Every one will allow
that the first number is too small to possess the sentiments, be influenced by the
interests of the people, or secure against corruption; a thousand would be too
numerous to be capable of deliberating."); 2 id. at 259 (Melancton Smith); 2 id. at
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3. Legal and Psychological Solutions
Numerosity was a principal tool for keeping the House sympathetic.
For other branches of government, the Founders utilized different tools. For
example, sympathy would be promoted because officials of the federal
government would be subject to the same laws they imposed on everyone
else. 5 In other words, government officials would have few of the legal
privileges, immunities, and prerogatives that distinguished officials from
the citizenry in Europe. But how could one be certain that federal officials
simply wouldn't exempt themselves from laws they found inconvenient?
The people, Madison said, would prevent this, and a people who could
stand for any other state of affairs "will be prepared to tolerate anything but
liberty. ' 86
Further support for sympathy would come from psychological factors,
such as the natural tendency of the elected to be well-disposed toward those
who elected them. As Madison remarked, office holders "will enter into the
public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a
temporary affection at least to their constituents." 87 Federalist Pelatiah
Webster cited the needs of reputation and public approbation, and the dread
of censure, shame, and divine judgment as incitements to duty.88 However,
260 (John Lansing speaking at the New York ratifying convention); The Federal
Farmer, Letter No. 7, in STORING, supra note 1, at 74.
James Iredell dismissed the Anti-Federalist concern by stating that the precise
number was "a mere matter of calculation"--meaning that it could not be cal-
culated. PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1,
at 337. See also ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 151 (Oliver
Ellsworth writing as "The Landholder").
85 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 1, at 352 (James Madison); 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 647 (Zachariah Johnson at the Virginia ratifying convention stating
that members of Congress "will bear an equal share of the burdens imposed on the
people"); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 42 (Noah Webster stating that Senators will be "subject to the same laws" that
bind everyone else); id. at 124 (Pelatiah Webster citing equal application of laws
on Congressmen).
86 THE FEDERALISTNO. 57, supra note 1, at 353 (James Madison). For some time
in the twentieth century the fear that federal officials would exempt themselves from
their own laws became a reality. There were some corrections made in 1995 as a result
of a shift in Congressional control. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Cooper & Helen Dewar,
Passing the Torch on Capitol Hill; GOP Takes Over; House Sets Off at Quick Pace;
Gingrich Gets Gavel, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at Al.
87 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 1, at 351 (James Madison).
88 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 124.
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Anti-Federalists such as Joseph M'Dowall of North Carolina, cited
psychological factors cutting the other way. Representatives, he argued,
would likely win re-election and end up spending eight or ten years in
Congress. He noted that "[a]t such a distance from their homes, and for so
long a time, they will have no feeling for, nor any knowledge of, the
situation of the people." 9
4. Dependence as a Solution
A more substantial guarantee of sympathy was dependence-that is,
dependence of elected officials on the people." Later, this Article shall
explore more fully the contemporary connotations of the word
dependence.9 For now, it is enough to say that eighteenth century political
expositors saw dependence of government on the citizenry as so necessary
to sympathy and so allied with it that they often joined the terms in the
same sentence. Moreover, they sometimes credited dependence with the
benefits that, more precisely, came from the sympathy that dependence
created. David Hume's influential Idea ofa Perfect Commonwealth argued
89 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 88 (speaking at the North Carolina ratifying
convention).
90 "This dependence, and the necessity of being bound, himself and his
posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent are the true and they are the
strong chords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 1, at 216 (Alexander Hamilton). See also id. No.
52 at 327 (James Madison) (stating, "As it is essential to liberty that the govern-
ment in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly
essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate
dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people."); id. No. 51, at 322
(James Madison) (stating, "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
control on the government . ").
See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 252 (Hamilton speaking at the New York
ratifying convention); 2 id. at 298 (Richard Harrison speaking at the same
convention: "If the senator is conscious that his reelection depends only on the will
of the people, and is not fettered by any law, he will feel an ambition to deserve
well of the public."); 3 id. at 647 (Zachariah Johnson at the Virginia ratifying
convention stating, "When the members of the government depend on ourselves for
their appointment, and will bear an equal share of the burdens imposed on the
people,--when their duty is inseparably connected with their interests,-I conceive
there can be no danger.").
See also Orrin G. Hatch, "A Dependence on the People, "77 CORNELL L. REV.
959 (1992).
9 See infra Part II.A.
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that dependence was a guard against faction.92 Americans similarly
contended that it was a guard against aristocracy,93 monarchy,94 and
oppression. 5 "Publius" set forth the new federalist ideal as one in which
92 HUME, supra note 1, at 153-54:
There are two things to be guarded against in every senate: its combina-
tion and its division. Its combination is most dangerous; and against this
inconvenience we have provided the following remedies: (1) The great
dependence of the senators on the people by annual elections, and that not
by an undistinguished rabble, like the English electors, but by men of
fortune and education....
The division of the Senate is prevented:'... (2) As faction supposes a
combination in a separate interest, it is prevented by their dependence on
the people....
It is necessary, likewise, to prevent both combination and division in the
thousand magistrates. This is done sufficiently by the separation of places
and interests.
But, lest that should not be sufficient, their dependence on the ten
thousand for their elections serves to the same purpose.
Id. For a summary of the influence of Hume's thought, transmitted through
Founders such as Franklin, John Adams, Hamilton, and Madison, see id. at i-/x
(summarized by Charles W. Hendel).
See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 289 (John Lansing, at the New York
ratifying convention, arguing that dependence obviates faction); 3 id. at 17 (Wilson
Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention stating that the dependence arising
'from frequent elections prevents combination).
93 THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 1, at 389-90 (Madison). See also 2
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 105 (Fisher Ames, speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying
convention); 4 id. at 132 (James Iredell, speaking at the North Carolina ratifying
convention: "In this government there is not the least symptom of an aristocracy,
which is, where the government is in a select body of men entirely independent of
the people .... Will not all authority flow, in every instance, directly or indirectly
from the people?").
94 THE FEDERALISTNo. 70, supra note 1, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating,
"The ingredients which constitute energy in the executive are; [first,] unity;
[secondly,] duration; [thirdly,] an adequate provision for its support; [fourthly,]
competent powers. The ingredients which constitute safety in the 'republican
sense are [first,] a due dependence on the people, and [secondly,] a due responsibil-
ity.").
95 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 420 (John Marshall speaking at the Virginia
ratifying convention). See also SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 165
("Socius").
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both the central government and the states were to be "substantially
dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States... in fact
but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different
powers and designed for different purposes."96 John Adams made much the
same point with respect to the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government. 97
Federalists and Anti-Federalists heartily agreed, therefore, that
government must be ultimately dependent on the citizenry. They disagreed
about how best to assure this and on whether the proposed Constitution did
a good enough job. In words that suggest just how central to the ratification
debate the concept of sympathy was, Noah Webster, the great lexicogra-
pher, summarized what he saw as the basic Anti-Federalist argument:
Your whole reasoning, and that of all the opposers of the Federal
Government, is built on this false principle, that the Federal Legislature
will be a body distinct from and independent of the people....
But the principle is false. The Congress, under the proposed
Constitution, will have the same interest as the people-they are apart of
the people-their interest is inseparable from that of the people .... The
only requisite to secure liberty, is to connect the interest of the Governors
with that of the governed.98
To meet Anti-Federalist concern, the friends of the Constitution, following
the lead of Lord Bolingbroke," emphasized the value of relatively short
96 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 294 (James Madison). See also id.
No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (stating, "In the latter [states], the local or
municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no
more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the
general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.").
9 3 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 419:
The executive power is not naturally, nor necessarily, and ought never to be,
in fact, derived from the legislative. The body of the people.., is the
fountain and original [sic] of all power and authority, executive and
judicial, as well as legislative; and the executive ought to be appointed by
the people, in the formation of their constitution, as much as the legislative.
... The executive represents the people for one purpose, as much as the
legislative does for another; and the executive ought to be as distinct and
independent of the legislative, as the legislative is of that.
Id.
98 SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 170-71.
99 2 BOLINGBROKE, supra note 1, at 99:
... [T]he design of the revolution [of 1688] was not accomplished, the
benefit of it was not secured to us, the just expectations of the nation could
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terms and frequent elections to maintaining dependence. For Noah
Webster, in fact, frequent elections were the panacea: "The only barrier
against tyranny, that is necessary in any State, is the election ofLegislators
by the yeomanry of that State. Preserve that, and every privilege is safe."'"
If other Federalists did not think elections would solve everything, they
certainly saw them as the chief tool for maintaining dependence and,
therefore, sympathy.' '
As for such elections, just how frequent was frequent enough? The
Federalists admitted that, like the optimal size of a legislature, the
not be answered, unless the freedom of elections, and the frequency,
integrity and independency of parliaments were sufficiently provided for.
Id. An example of Bolingbroke's influence: He was John Adams's favorite
philosopher. CHINARD, supra note 1, at 209. See also id. at 21, 28, 231-32.
100 SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 171.
101 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 1, at 227 (James Madison)
(stating that, "The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not
only that all power should be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with
it should be kept in dependence on the people by a short duration of their
appointments... ."); id., NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (writing that, "Frequent
elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and
sympathy can be effectually secured. . ... biennial elections, under the federal
system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the House of
Representatives on their constituents."); id., No. 57, at 352 (James Madison)
(writing that, "All these securities, however, would be found very insufficient
without the restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the House of
Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual
recollection of their dependence on the people."); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 42 (Noah Webster referring to
election of Senators every six years as furthering sympathy); id. at 364 (James
Iredell writing, "every two years a new body of representatives with all the energy
of popular feelings will come."); SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 166
("Socius").
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 77, supra note 1, at 463-64 (Alexander
Hamilton) (defending the term of the President). See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1,
at 199 (Governor Huntington, at the Connecticut ratifying convention, arguing that
terms are sufficiently short to assure dependence); 2 id. at 166 (Rev. Samuel
Stillman speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 3 id. at 14 (Wilson
Nicholas speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 3 id. at 97 (Madison at the
same convention arguing that biennial rotation of Senators would inhibit
combinations and intrigues).
In the federal convention, Hamilton argued that, frequent elections could
actually decrease dependency by reducing popular interest, but he seems to have
abandoned this argument. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 1, at 362.
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frequency could not be determined exactly.0 2 But, they argued that the
Constitution struck a good balance.0 3 Anti-Federalists, however, contended
that the proposed terms were too long. Thus, "Brutus," one of the best Anti-
Federalist writers, averred that a six-year term would destroy sympathy
between the Senate and the people; he preferred four years.' Anti-
Federalists also attacked the two-year tenure for representatives-arguing
for one year.'05 For example, the transcript of the Massachusetts ratifying
convention records these comments of General Thompson:
Gen. THOMPSON accordingly said, that, however just, however
good, and however upright the administration may be, there was still a
great necessity for annual elections.
He thought a change of election was for the best, even if the
administration pleased the people. Do the members of Congress, says he,
displease us, we call them home, and they obey. Now, where is the
difference of their having been elected for one or two years? It is said that
the members cannot learn sufficiently in that time. Sir, I hope we shall
never send men who are not learned. Let these members know their
dependence upon the people, and I say it will be a check on them, even if
they were not good men. Here the general broke out in the following
pathetic apostrophe: "0 my country, never give up your annual elections!
102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 1, at 327 (James Madison) (writing,
"But what particular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the
purpose does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must
depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be connected.").
303 E.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 38 (Noah Webster arguing that the Senators' six year terms "rendered [them]
sufficiently dependent on their constituents").
'04 See The Federal Farmer No. 63, part 2, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 185:
Men six years in office absolutely contract callous habits, and cease, in too
great a degree, to feel their dependence, and for the condition of their
constituents. Senators continued in offices three or four years, will be in
them longer than any popular erroneous opinions will probably continue to
actuate their electors.
Id. Compare his criticism of the Constitution's judiciary article in Brutus, Nos. 15
& 16, in STORING, supra note 1. See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 315
(Melancton Smith at the New York ratifying convention arguing that the terms of
federal Senators, unlike those of the New York State legislature, are too long to
assure dependence).
105 E.g., PAMPHLETS'ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 8-9 (Elbridge Gerry writing as "Columbian Patriot"); ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DIscussION BY THE
PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 267 (George Clinton writing as "Cato").
(VOL. 91
A REMINDER
young men, never give up your jewel!" He apologized for his zeal.... He
concluded by hoping that the representatives would be annually elected,
and thereby feel a greater dependence on the people.'
0 6
Moreover, Anti-Federalists argued that frequent elections were simply
not enough and that the proposed Constitution contained provisions that
would impair dependence and sympathy and neglected provisions to
promote them. Anti-Federalists claimed that the government would be
rendered too independent by its powers to raise revenue, 10 7 maintain
standing armies,10 8 and control elections to federal office.'0 9 At least one
prominent Anti-Federalist, James Monroe, thought the President's
dependence on the people would be impaired by over-dependence on the
states and on the Senate."' Anti-Federalists generally were very concerned
about the "Ten Miles Square"--the proposed seat of the federal govern-
ment to be located outside the boundary of any state. The transcripts of the
New York ratifying convention capture a memorable moment. Gilbert
Livingston, an Anti-Federalist, held the floor and commented:
What will be their situation in a federal town? Hallowed ground! Nothing
so unclean as state laws to enter there, surrounded, as they will be, by an
impenetrable wall of adamant and gold, the wealth of the whole country
flowing into it. [Here a member, who did not fully understand, called out
to know what WALL the gentleman meant; on which he turned, and
replied, "A wall of gold-of adamant, which will flow in from all parts
106 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 16. For another example of Anti-Federalist
concern about the length of terms, see 2 id. at 45, reporting the following at the
Massachusetts ratifying convention, "Col. JONES, (of Bristol,) objected to the
length of time. If men continue in office four or six years, they would forget their
dependence on the people, and be loath to leave their places. Men elevated so high
in power, they would fall heavy when they came down."
107 Centinel No. 21, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 53 ("In
short, by putting it in the power of the future government to levy money at pleasure,
and placing this government so independent of the people as to enable the
administration to gratify every corrupt passion of the mind, to riot on your spoils,
without check or control?").
10 E.g., A Democratic Federalist No. 29, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra
note 1, at 78; The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Conven-
tion of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in STORING, supra note 1, at 220.
'09 E.g., The Address and Reasons ofDissent of the Minority of the Convention
of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in STORING, supra note 1, at 211-12.
"' 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 488-89 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention).
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ofthe continent." At which flowing metaphor, a great laugh in the house.]
The gentleman continued: Their attention to their various business will
probably require their constant attendance. In this Eden will they reside
with their families, distant from the observation of the people. In such a
situation, men are apt to forget their dependence, lose their sympathy, and
contract selfish habits. Factions are apt to be formed, if the body becomes
permanent. The senators will associate only with men of their own class,
and thus become strangers to the condition of the common people. They
should not only return, and be obliged to live with the people, but return
to their former rank of citizenship, both to revive their sense of depend-
ence, and to gain a knowledge of the country."'
Jokes about Livingston's flowing wall of adamant continued in the
New York convention," 2 but there was no doubt that the "Ten Mile
Square" was a sensitive point for many Americans." 3 Part of Madison's
defense was that the new federal district would increase sympathy, or at
least make it more uniform," 4 and would prevent the central government
from becoming too dependent on any local district."1
Anti-Federalists also argued for the addition of recall and term limits
(then called "rotation in office"). Both of these were in the Articles of
Confederation but were absent from the Constitution. The Anti-Federa-
" 2 id. at 287-88. For another attack on the proposed federal city, see
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 18
(Elbridge Gerry writing as "A Columbian Patriot"). A related objection to the "Ten
Miles Square" was that its inhabitants would be largely government dependents.
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS
DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 265 (George Clinton
writing as "Cato:" "the asylum of the base, idle, avaricious and ambitious"). Cf 3
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 558 (John Marshall at the Virginia ratifying convention
refuting Anti-Federalist objections).
112 E.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 292 & 323.
"3 E.g., Brutus, No. 16, in STORING, supra note 1, at 189 (predicting that
Senators present in the federal city, whose inhabitants "will be the great and mighty
of the earth" will tend to be "weaned" from their constituents).
14 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 261
("As the powers & objects of the new Govt would be far greater <yn. heretofore>,
more private individuals wd. have business calling them to the seat of it, and it was
more necessary that the Govt should be in that position from which it could
contemplate with the most equal eye, and sympathize most equally with, every part
of the nation. These considerations he supposed would extort a removal even if a
law were made necessary.").
115 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 438 (Madison at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion).
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lists said they promoted dependence and sympathy.'16 The Federalists
16See, e.g., The Federal Farmer No. 63 part 2, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS,
supra note 1, at 187-88:
It will generally be expedient for a man who has served four years in
congress to return home, mix with the people, and reside some time with
them. This will tend to reinstate him in the interests, feelings, and views
similar to theirs, and thereby confirm in him the essential qualifications of
a legislator. Even in point of information, it may be observed, the useful
information of legislators is not acquired merely in studies in offices, and
in meeting to make laws from day to day. They must learn the actual
situation of the people by being among them, and when they have made
laws, return home and observe how they operate. Thus occasionally to be
among the people, is not only necessary to prevent or banish the callous
habits and self-interested views of office in legislators, but to afford them
necessary information, and to render them useful. Another valuable end is
answered by it; sympathy, and the means of communication between them
and their constituents, is substantially promoted.
Id. See also Montezuma No. 9, id. at 19 (arguing that absence of term limits would
make elected representatives too independent of the people); 2 ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 289-90, 293, 300 (John Lansing speaking at the New York ratifying
convention); 2 id. at 309-10 (Melancton Smith speaking at the same convention);
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 11-12
(Elbridge Gerry as "A Columbian Patriot" stating that rotation in office "teaches
[the representative] the feelings of the governed."); and The Federal Farmer Nos.
76-77, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 217.
In considering the principle of rotation I had occasion to distinguish the
condition of a legislator from that of a mere official man. We acquire
certain habits, feelings, and opinions, as men and citizens--others, and very
different ones, from a long continuance in office. It is, therefore, a valuable
observation in many bills of rights, that rulers ought frequently to return and
mix with the people. A legislature, in a free country, must be numerous; it
is in some degree a periodical assemblage of the people, frequently formed.
The principal officers in the executive and judicial departments 'must have
more permanency in office. Hence it may be inferred, that the legislature
will remain longer uncorrupted and virtuous; longer congenial to the people,
than the officers of those departments. If it is not, therefore in our power to
preserve republican principles for a series of ages, in all the departments of
government, we may a long while preserve them in a well formed legisla-
ture. To this end we ought to take every precaution to prevent legislators
becoming mere office-men; choose them frequently, make them recallable,
establish rotation among them, make them ineligible to offices, and give'
them as small a share as possible in the disposal of them.
Id. But see A Farmer No. 5, in STORING, supra note 1, at 263 (An Anti-Federalist
author, probably John Francis Mercer of Maryland, who believed rotation made
officials more rapacious).
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disagreed." 7
D. The Founding Generation's Passion for Sympathy Redux
Disagreements among the Founding Generation as to how best to
assure sympathy should not obscure for us the central points of agreement:
Republican government must share the attitudes and interests of the people.
To achieve this end, legislatures must be numerous, districts small,
prerogatives limited, terms short, and all branches of government ultimately
dependent on the people. As we shall see, independent of each other.
fl. INDEPENDENCE
A. Nature of and Reasons for Independence
Independence is, of course, the negative of dependence and of
dependency. As is true of "sympathy," these words also had different
connotations in the eighteenth century. The educated member of the
Founding Generation knew of their connection to the Latin verb dependeo
(infinitive form, dependere), meaning, originally, "to hang down;"118 and
quite aside from that, even in common speech the meaning of English
derivatives from Latin tended to be closer to the originals than they are
today."9 Thus, when people were described as "dependents," there was
something of the image of people who hung down from their patron-
analogous to the modem expression, "hangers-on."' 2 °
" 'THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 1, at 431 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating,
"The inference from it is that a man acting in the capacity of chief magistrate, under
a consciousness that in a very short time he must lay down his office, will be apt
to feel himself too little interested in it to hazard any material censure or perplexity
from the independent exertion of his powers, or from encountering the ill-humors,
however transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable part of the
society itself, or even in a predominant faction in the legislative body."). See also
2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 298 (Richard Harrison speaking at the New York
ratifying convention).
118 D.P. SIMPSON, CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY 179 (1968). The "e" in the
penult is long; the word should not be confused with the verb dependere, where the
"e" in the penult is short. The latter word means to pay or expend.
"' For information on the Latinate English of the Framers, see MCDONALD,
supra note 1; GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 93 (1979). For information on their classical educations, see
RICHARD, supra note 1.
1' Thus, Samuel Johnson's dictionary offered the following as the first two
definitions of "to depend:"
"1. To hang from... 2. To be in a state of servitude or expectation; to live
subject to the will of other; to retain to others."
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A person was a dependent when he or she relied on another for
protection, preference, or financial sustenance. As in ancient Rome, with
which the Founders so often identified, 2' slaves, children, and married
women all received protection and civic definition from the paterfamilias
and, accordingly, were his dependents.'22 Courtiers were the dependents of
the monarchs and aristocrats from whom they received political preference.
"Placemen" in the British Parliament and others who received salaries from
the Crown were dependents of the monarch, and therefore threatened to
render the legislative branch dependent on the executive. 123 Paupers were
dependents of whatever person or entity provided their bread. 2' Anti-
Federalists feared that the population of the "Ten Miles Square"--the
future District of Columbia--would be dominated by government
dependents.'25 A person or entity was independent only if that person or
entity did not depend on another for protection, political preferment, or
financial support.
26
The following was the first definition of "dependency:" "The state of hanging
down from a supporter." JOHNSON, supra note 1.
121 See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTIoN 25-26 (1967); RICHARD, supra note 1.
'22 MCDONALD, supra note 1.
' See 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 375-76 (William Grayson speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention); 2 id. at 52-53 (D. Taylor speaking in the Massachu-
setts ratifying convention); 4 id. at 289 (Rawlins Lowndes speaking in the South
Carolina ratifying convention).
124 Thus, John Adams remarked that the poor were "too dependent upon other
Men to have a Will of their own." FERLING, supra note 1, at 156.
'
25 See 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 558 (John Marshall at the Virginia ratifying
convention answering Anti-Federalist objections).
126 Cf Bolingbroke's discussion of the need for the independence of the
branches of government from each other:
Should angels and archangels come down from heaven to govern us, the
same danger would exist until the springs, from whence it arises, were cut
off.., because ... public liberty must be in danger whenever a free
constitution, the proper and sole security of it, is dependent on will; and a
free constitution, like ours, is dependent on will, whenever the will of one
estate can direct the conduct of all three.
2 BOLINGBROKE, supra note 1, at 154.
One reason the Senate rather than a group of Presidential appointees was
deemed to be the fit council for the executive was the Senate's independence of the
executive. PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 229-31 (Alexander Contee Hanson writing as "Aristides"); cf id. at 330
(George Mason claiming that without a proper council of presidential appointees,
the executive will be one "directed by minions and favorites.").
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The participants in the Constitutional debate, apparently unanimously,
believed that for liberty to survive republican decision makers must be
independent. (As we shall see, government officials' dependence on the
people both limited and further justified this rule). There were three reasons
why the independence of decision makers was important. First, only
independent people could use their intelligence fully and impartially to
solve problems.' Dependents were not really free agents-they were
exponents of the attitudes and ideas of their patrons. If one jiggled the
sustainer, one jostled the dependents. On this point, Hamilton's views were
typical: "In the general course of human nature, a power over a man s
subsistence amounts to a power over his will."' 28 Gouvemeur Morris,
whose pen polished the Constitution to its ultimate sheen, observed that
while "[i]n Religion the Creature is apt to forget its Creator.... [I]t is
otherwise in political affairs."' 29 Even if a dependent happened to
127 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 491, 517 (James Wilson, at the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention, tying judicial impartiality to independence); PAMPHLETS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 36 (Noah Webster
tying executive and judicial impartiality to independence); ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE
PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 275-76 (George Clinton, writing as "Cato,"
citing need for independence of President and Senate to better assure impartiality.).
Cf. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 204 (William Lenoir, at the North Carolina
ratifying convention stating, "We are to exercise our own judgments, and act
independently."). See also infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
128 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 1, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton). See
also FERLING, supra note 1, at 156 (John Adams stating that paupers are dependent
on others and thus have no will of their own.); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 373 (Hamilton stating that "Those who pay
are the masters of those who are paid."); 2 id. at 202-03 (Gouverneur Morris stating
that dependents have no will of their own); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 304 (Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney stating at the South Carolina ratifying convention that when
South Carolina senators were chosen by the state house, "being their mere
creatures, they could not be supposed to have that freedom of will as to form a
proper check."); 3 id. at 17 (Wilson Nicholas at the Virginia ratifying convention
stating, "Any branch of government that depends on the will of another for supplies
of money, must be in a state of subordinate dependence .... ").
Cf 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 258-59 (Madison at the Virginia ratifying
convention predicting that the states will have more employed dependents than the
central government).
129 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at
512. Cf THE FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 1, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton)
(stating, "In the general course of human nature, apower over a man's subsistence
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disagree with his patron, he usually had to weigh whether expressing that
disagreement might threaten his livelihood, his safety, or his political
position. This muddied, at the least, one's ability to make judgments on
affairs of state. 3°
Another reason republican decision makers had to be independent was
this: Because the votes and other decisions of dependents .really were
attributable to their patrons, for practical purposes dependency resulted in
fewer real decision makers, and therefore, less varied input into public
decisions. Moreover, if the real decision makers. were relatively few, they
would operate the state for their benefit rather than for the public good: the
condition the Founding Generation called "corruption."'' Having fewer
real decision makers lowers the contracting costs for factions and juntos
amounts to a power over his will."). According to one commentator, John Adams
wrote in 1776 that "[c]hildren, servants and the propertyless were excluded [from
civic life] because they were 'too little acquainted with public affairs to form a
right judgment, and too dependent upon other men to have a will of their own."'
Quoted in McDONALD, supra note 1, at 161. Cf 1 THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 124 (Madison opining on the "biassed
directions of a dependent judge.").
' 1 sometimes bring this home to fellow academics by the following challenge:
From the entire nation, name any two law professors out of the hundreds at state
universities who, after serious, impartial consideration, have recommended cuts in
state funding for their own institutions. I have never metanyone who has been able
to meet that challenge. The source of the paycheck renders vaunted professorial
independence in this situation almost non-existent, even in times of state budgetary
stress, even if the money could be more compassionately used to aid the poor or to
reduce unfair taxes, and even with the knowledge that public funding of law
schools is a regressive transfer from the general taxpayers to the presently and
prospectively well-to-do.
I know of only a single law professor who has ever done so publicly. I can
testify from personal experience that even if one has tenure it is very risky business,
and that if one does survive at the job there are other, very unpleasant, personal and
professional consequences.
The corrosive effects on academic integrity resulting from direct university
dependence on state government are, perhaps, too rarely acknowledged.
'"' See generally 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 509 (James Wilson at the
Pennsylvania ratification convention: "Is there not also greater danger that the
majority of such a body [the then-U.S. Congress] might be more easily bribed than
the majority of one not only more numerous, but checked by a division of two or
three distinct and independent parts?"); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 512 (Gouverneur Morris on the effects of
a dependence of one legislative chamber on the other).
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seeking to "concert and execute their plans of oppression"' 32-thereby
increasing further the risk of corruption.
B. Independence of the Citizenry
In the view of the Founders, independence of individual citizen-voters
was a prerequisite for liberty and for republican government. Only
independent citizens--citizens who were self-supporting economically,
were independent legally and socially, and who could defend themselves
militarily, would have the fortitude to evict office holders who abused their
trust.'33 In England, the franchise had long been limited to those who were
self-sufficient.'34 In America, too, "'the public' included only independent
adult males,"' a5 and "no member of the public could be dependent upon any
other and still be reckoned a member of the public."'36 The prevailing
political literary canon reinforced the point.' Niccolo Machiavelli, a
luminary in that niche, distinguished clearly between "free men or... those
who depend on others."'3 Bolingbroke had written of "private independ-
132 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 1, at 83 (James Madison). See also
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 12
(Elbridge Gerry decrying the relatively low number of Presidential electors, leading
to "aristocratic junto, who may easily combine in each State"); id. at 268 (Edmund
Randolph claiming the small number of states in the confederation congress
increased the opportunities for foreign influence).
'33 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 10 (Wilson Nicholas speaking at the Virginia
ratifying convention). See also 3 id. at 14 ("[F]or those who have sold themselves
to their representatives will have no right to complain, if they, in their turn, barter
away their rights and liberties; but those who have not themselves been bought, will
never consent to be sold."). See also ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note
1, at 270-71 (George Clinton, writing as "Cato," defending participation in free
government only by those who are suijuris.); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 56 (Noah Webster stating that armed
citizenry will defend itself against unjust laws).
134 MCDONALD, supra note 1, at 25-26.
35 Id. at 70.
'36 Id. at 71.
137 See id. at 74.
'3 Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Decade of Titius Livius, in 1
MACHIAVELLI: THE CHIEF WORKS AND OTHERS 193 (Allan Gilbert trans., 1965).
Cf 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 97 (James Iredell, at the North Carolina ratifying
convention: "This personal independence is the surest safeguard of the public
freedom.").
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ency, which can alone support public liberty under such a government as
ours."'39 Hume noted that "property when united causes much greater
dependence than the same property when dispersed," 4 ° and Harrington
prescribed dependence through receipt of large landholdings as a path to
monarchy. 4' The widespread ownership of property was necessary to the
independence that was crucial to a free state.1
42
It was critical also that decision makers not be dependent on the state.
John Adams advised his son Thomas that one involved in politics:
[M]ust make it a rule never to become dependent on public employments
for subsistence. Let him have a trade, a profession, a farm, a shop,
12 BOLINGBROKE, supra note 1, at 64.
140 HUME, supra note 1, at 72-73:
Those who assert that the balance of our government inclines towards
absolute monarchy may support their opinion by the following reasons ....
It is evident that much less property in a single hand will be able to
counterbalance a greater property in several, not only because it is difficult
to make many persons combine in the same views and measures, but
because property when united causes much greater dependence than the
same property when dispersed.... But a man possessed of f 100,000 a year,
if he has either any generosity or any cunning, may create a great depend-
ence by obligations and still a greater by expectations.
14' HARRINGTON, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting Machiavelli to the following
effect):
"[A]nd he who goes about to introduce monarchy where the condition of
the people is equal shall never bring it to pass, unless he cull out such of
them as are the most turbulent and ambitious, and make them gentlemen or
noblemen, not in name but in effect, that is by enriching them with lands,
castles, and treasures, that may gain them power amongst the rest and bring
in the rest unto dependence upon themselves, to the end that, they maintain-
ing their ambition by the prince, the prince may maintain his power by
them."
Wherefore, as in this place I agree with Machiavel that a nobility or
gentry, overbalancing a popular government, is the utter bane and destruc-
tion of it ....
142 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
59 (Noah Webster). See also SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 51
(Nicholas Collins, writing as "A Foreign Spectator," praising the fact that in
America "no necessity renders great numbers indigent, consequently dependent,
poor in spirit, and in many respects less valuable as men and citizens."); id. at 340
("Atticus" writing that widespread holding of small estates is a democratic
influence, large estates an aristocratic influence, and dependence a monarchical
influence).
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something where he can honestly live, and then he may engage in public
affairs, if invited, upon independent principles. My advice to my children
is to maintain an independent character.'43
Most of the participants in the Constitutional debate had been
immersed in the history of the Roman republic, which was eventually
destroyed in part by citizen dependence on great men and on the state.1"
All participants were determined that the new government neither be ruled
by dependents nor be likely to encourage dependency. Anti-Federalists
opposed the new Constitution in part because they believed it would foster
dependence. For example, Governor George Clinton of New York, writing
as "Cato," attacked the constitutional powers of the President because "the
deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single magistrate, enables him in
their exercise to create a numerous train of dependents."' 45 Much of the
debate over whether there should be a federal town apart from state
territory revolved around the disputed point of whether such a capital
would create a class of citizens dependent on a government too independent
of the people.1
46
Gouverneur Morris's comments at the federal convention illustrate the
trepidation participants felt when contemplating possible loss of citizen
independence. He stated:
The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics &
manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will
such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty? Will they be the
impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy?... The man who does not give his
vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Children
do not vote. Why? because they want prudence. because they have no will
of their own.147
143 Quoted in DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 415 (2001). Adams also
praised George Washington because he" 'judges more independently than any man
I ever saw."' Id.
" On the pervasive impact of Roman history on the Founding, see Natelson,
supra note 1, and sources cited therein. See also RICHARD, supra note 1. Note the
extract from the writings of Samuel Adams, id. at 99 (contrasting the "independent
spirit" of an early Roman with the contemptible spirit of those who submitted to
Caesar).
14 ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING
ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 261.
' See supra notes 11 1-13 and accompanying text.
47 See also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
1, at 202-03; CHINARD, supra note 1, at 92 (John Adams expressing similar views).
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When the question arose as to whether the Constitution should require
officials to meet a property qualification so as to assure their personal
independence, Morris responded that, "If qualifications are proper, he wd.
prefer them in the electors rather than the elected."'
48 Madison agreed,149
and most others would have, also. 50 Even so, there was strong support for
property requirements for elected officials as well as voters."'
Independence also required that freemen be armed for their own
protection, not merely against invaders or criminals, but against their own
government. This, too, was universal sentiment. Federalists such as Noah
Webster'52 and James Madison'53 saw an armed citizenry as a protection
against unjust laws. Patrick Henry inveighed against the Constitution by
claiming that under its rule, the people would be "transformed from
respectable, independent citizens, to abject, dependent subjects or slaves"'"
and that, "If you have given up your militia, and Congress shall refuse to
arm them, you have lost every thing. Your existence will be precarious,
because you depend on others, whose interests are not affected by your
infelicity." '55
' "2 THE REcoRDSOFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,supra note 1, at 121.
492 id. at 124. Cf 2 id. at 126 (Oliver Ellsworth opposes a clause disqualifying
"public debtors" from the legislature because, unlike in England, in America they
are not dependent on the Crown.).
50 Following are some other samples of contemporary praise for the value of
citizen independence: Cato No. 14, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at
38 (praising "the liberties and interests of the more northern states, where freedom,
independence, industry, equality and frugality are natural to the climate and soil
... ."); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 38 (Francis Dana at the Massachusetts ratifying
convention on advantages of independent freemen over slaves); 2 id. at 130 (James
Bowdoin, at the same convention, stating, "the strength, the welfare, and happiness
of a country [depends] upon the numbers, the ease, and independence of its
yeomanry."); 4 id. at 87 (John Steele, at the North Carolina ratifying convention,
comparing a "government without revenue" to "a poor, forlorn, dependent
individual, and said that the one would be as helpless and contemptible as the
other."); 4 id. at 97 (James Iredell speaking at the same convention).
51 See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
1, at 248 (Charles Pinkney). One argument against the Constitution was that it
would render the states insufficiently independent, a claim that Federalists denied.
See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 337 (Melancton Smith at the New York
ratifying convention).
52 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
56.
153 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 299-300 (James Madison).
'54 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 148 (at the Virginia ratifying convention).
155 3 id. at 388 (at the Virginia ratifying convention).
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The Founders believed that only when fortified by economic, legal,
social, and military independence could men make choices in a reasoned,
impartial way. Such men could say of their own decisions much as
Delegate Zachariah Johnson said of his when, near the end of the Virginia
ratifying convention, he announced that his support for the Constitution had
"not arisen from a blind acquiescence or dependence on the assertions and
opinions of others, but from a full persuasion of its rectitude."' 56 As Tench
Coxe remarked regarding the electorate of prospective House districts, "the
suffrages of six thousand enlightened and independent freemen are above
all price."'5 7
C. Independence Within Government
Independence of governmental actors and entities is potentially of two
sorts: independence from each other and independence from the people.
The Founders crafted the Constitution so there was plenty of the first sort
and very little of the second. To understand why this was the case, we must
first examine the plan for independence of governmental entities from each
other. This subpart is devoted to inter-governmental independence. I
approach the subject by addressing a pair of questions: (1) To what extent
were governmental entities to be independent of each other? and (2) Why?
1. Independence of Governmental Entities from Each Other
The governmental entities most discussed in the Constitutional debate
of 1787-1789 were: (1) the proposed federal government as a unit; (2) the
states as units; (3) the proposed federal Senate; (4) the proposed federal
House of Representatives; (5) the proposed President; (6) the proposed
Vice-President; and (7) the proposed federal courts. There were, of course,
multiple branches in the state governments as well, but they were men-
tioned mostly as a source of lessons for the proposed federal govern-
ment.15
8
156 3 id. at 644.
15 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
143.
111 But see 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 408-09 (Madison at the Virginia ratifying
convention stating, "The sum of the powers given up by the people of Virginia is
divided into two classes--one to the federal and the other to the state government.
Each is subdivided into three branches. These may be kept independent of each
other in the one as well as the other.").
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Most of the Founding Generation clearly favored a high level of
independence among all of these government entities-that is, between states
and federal government and among the various branches of the federal
government. Very early in the federal Constitutional Convention there was
some sentiment for abolishing the states'59 or subordinating them to the
central government. " By the time of the ratification debate, however, nearly
everyone--including (in public at least) Hamilton-had become convinced
that the states should have a major role to play in the new system, and that for
the purpose of playing that role they should act fairly independently of
the central government. 16 1 This state independence of action was to be
protected by the Constitution's enumeration of federal powers, 62 by popular
sentiment, 163 by the state legislatures' influence over the Senate,' 6 by state
participation in election of federal officials generally, 65 by the state
' 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 136
(George Read stating, "Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Govermts. We
must look beyond their continuance. A national Govt. must soon of necessity
swallow all of them up. They will soon be reduced to the mere office of electing
the national Senate. He was agst. patching up the old federal System: he hoped the
idea wd. be dismissed.").
At the time of the ratification debate, one of the very few writers to favor total
consolidation was Pelatiah Webster. PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 129-30.
160 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 287
(Hamilton saying that he would continue the states but treat them only as
governmental corporations for local purposes.).
161 THE FEDERALIST No. 32, supra note 1, at 197-98 (Alexander Hamilton)
(writing, "[T]he individual States should possess an independent and uncontrolla-
ble authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants."); id.
No. 33, at 205 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing, "The inference from the whole is
that the individual States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an
independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which
they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on imports and
exports."); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 355-56, 362 (Hamilton speaking at the New
York ratifying convention); 3 id. at 244 (George Nicholas speaking at the Virginia
ratifying convention); 3 id. at 367 (Madison speaking at the Virginia ratifying
convention).
162 E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 1, at 292 (James Madison).
163 E.g., id. No. 17, at 119 (Alexander Hamilton).
'64 E.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 142 (Tench Coxe).
165 E.g., id. at 152 (Tench Coxe).
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militias," and by an independentjudiciary that would enforce the limitations
set forth in the Constitution. 67
On the other hand, most people also believed that the central govern-
ment had to be substantially independent of the states.1 61 The proposed
Constitution sought to secure this independence through such devices as
'6 E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 299-300 (James Madison).
167 E.g., id. No. 16, at 117 (Alexander Hamilton) & No. 44, at 285-86 (James
Madison); ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED
DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 43 & 46
(James Sullivan as "Cassius"). For other contemporary recognition of the principle
of judicial review, see 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 71 (John Steele speaking at the
North Carolina ratifying convention); 2 id. at 446, 489 (James Wilson speaking at
the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 id. at 541 (Patrick Henry speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention); 3 id. at 548 (Edmund Pendleton speaking at the
same convention).
'6 See Philanthropos No. 7, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 17;
A Federal Republican No. 8, id.; 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 244 (George Nicholas
speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 367
(Madison speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 37 (Madison speaking on the
independence of Congress from the states); I id. at 69 (James Wilson stating that
both branches of the legislature ought to be independent of the states); l id. at 176
(Randolph averring need for federal executive to be chosen separately from states);
1 id. at 215-16 (Madison declaring that allowing states to fix salaries of federal
officials would leave the latter too dependent); l id. at 228 (report of the committee
of the whole stating that long terms for Senators were necessary to assure
independence from states); l id. at 514 (Gouvemeur Morris); THE FEDERALIST NO.
30, supra note 1, at 191-92 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing that federal government
should not have to rely on states for revenue); id., NO. 43, at 272 (James Madison)
(defending the Ten Miles Square as assuring federal independence of states); id.,
No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (stating, "To have submitted it to the legislative
discretion of the States would have been improper for the same reason; and for the
additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State
governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent
on the people alone."); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 1, at 141-42 (Tench Coxe arguing that Senators' independence from
their states would be furthered by the system of individual voting in the Senate);
SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 121 (George Nicholas as "State Soldier"
contending that there was an excessive dependence of Congress on the states under
the Confederation).
To further secure federal independence from the states, James Wilson favored
adding a disqualification from state office for Senators. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,.supra note 1, at 428-29.
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direct popular election of the members of the House of Representatives,'69
long terms for Senators,170 governmental salaries set and paid at the federal
level, ' the flexibility of the Necessary and Proper Clause,' a seat of
government separate from any state,'73 and federal revenue powers
independent from state obstruction.'74 The federal government and states
would form a system of parallel sovereignty that Hamilton said resembled
the legislative structure in ancient Rome:
It is well known that in the Roman republic the legislative authority in the
last resort resided for ages in two different political bodies-not as
branches of the same legislature, but as distinct and independent
legislatures, in each of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one, .the
patrician; in the other, the plebeian.... And yet these two legislatures
coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic attained to the pinnacle of
human greatness. 75
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
170 See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 296 (Chancellor Robert Livingston arguing
at the New York ratifying convention that Senators would be rendered too
dependent on the states if recallable); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 228 (Committee of the Whole recommending long
terms for Senators to assure independence from states).
'7' See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1,
at 215-16; 2 id. at 291 (Madison arguing that states fixing-federal officers' salaries
would leave those officers too dependent on states). See also 3 ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 369-70 (Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention); 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 372 (Edmund Randolph and
Rufus King), l id. at 373 (Madison and Hamilton), l id. at 428 (Jonathan Dayton);
2 id. at 292 (Daniel Carroll, John Dickinson, and Oliver Ellsworth).
172 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 460 (James
Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
173 See 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 438 (Madison at the Virginia ratifying
convention); 3 id. at 439-40 (Edmund Pendleton at the same convention).
"74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The participants often noted, favorably or
unfavorably, that the new federal revenue power would be independent of the
states. See, e.g., 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 83-84, 86 (Whitmill Hill at the North
Carolina ratifying convention); 4 id. at 87 (the North Carolina ratifying convention,
John Steele recorded as saying that, "A government without revenue he compared
to a poor, forlorn, dependent individual, and said that the one would be as helpless
and contemptible as the other."); 3 id. at 119-20 (Edmund Randolph at the Virginia
ratifying convention); 3 id. at 128-29 (Madison at the same convention); 3 id. at
244 (George Nicholas at the same convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, supra note
1, at 188-93 (Alexander Hamilton).
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 34, supra note 1, at 206 (Alexander Hamilton).
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However, Oliver Ellsworth pointed out that there was a precedent closer to
home: the concurrent jurisdiction under the Articles of Confederation of
Congress and the states over military offenses.'76
To be sure, the independence of states and federal government from
each other was not complete-in eighteenth century usage, not "perfect."'"
Both governments would rely on each other in some respects, 8 with
reliance of the nation on the states somewhat heavier than vice-versa. 79 But
the dominant feature of the system was the large measure of independence
each level of government was to enjoy.
Nearly all debate participants seem to have believed that there should
be a high degree of independence among the various federal branches.'8 °
Each branch "should have a will of its own.""' The participants shared
Bolingbroke's ideal of a legislature free of the kind of executive branch
corruption induced by dependence. 2 The new Constitution therefore
176 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 195-96 (speaking at the Connecticut ratifying
convention).
-7 Samuel Johnson's A Dictionary of the English Language, gives as the first
definition of "perfect" the following: "Complete; consummate; finished; neither
defective nor redundant." (A "defect" in contemporary usage meant an insuffi-
ciency.) JOHNSON, supra note 1. The definition most closely approximating our
current use of the word "perfect" was the third, reading "Pure; blameless; clear;
immaculate. This is a sense chiefly theological." Id.
18 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 352 (Hamilton at the New York ratifying
convention, speaking of "that mutual dependence which forms the essence of
union.").
179 See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
Iso E.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 479 (James Wilson speaking at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention).
18' THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 321 (James Madison) (stating,"[I]t
is evident that each department should have a will of its own.... It is equally
evident that the members of each department should be as little dependent as
possible on those of the others for the emoluments annexed to their offices."); id.
NO. 68, at 413 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating, "Another and no less important
desideratum was that the executive should be independent for his continuance in
office on all but the people themselves."); 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 510-11 (James
Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention arguing that neither the President
nor the Senate will be nor should be "tools" of the other).
182 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 375 (William Grayson speaking at the Virginia
ratifying convention); 2 id. at 264 (Hamilton at the New York ratifying convention,
although he might have been speaking disingenuously, as often); ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE
PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at 273-75 (George Clinton writing as "Cato");
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 139
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prohibited members of Congress serving in the executive branch'8 3 and
guaranteed them freedom of speech.' The Vice-President, because of his
legislative duties, was to be independent of the President" 5 (a point modem
Americans seem to have forgotten).
Not only was Congress to be independent of the executive, but each
chamber of Congress was to be independent of the other. 86 Further, the
(Tench Coxe noting that the President would not have "placemen" in the
legislature).
Cf Bolingbroke:
Time and trouble, indeed, may be sometimes required to lead independent
men, who judge for themselves, and comply because they are convinced;
whereas neither one nor the other are wanting to determine such as hold to
a court by a corrupt dependency on it: for they are soon disciplined, and
ready to perform the whole exercise of parliamentary mercenaries at the
beat of a drum.
2 BOLINGBROKE, supra note 1, at 146.
See also 2 id. at 148:
The democratical power is no longer kept under the same dependencies; and
if a house of commons should now fail to assert that independent share in
the supreme legislative power, which the constitution assigns to this
assembly, it could not proceed, as it might and sometimes did formerly,
from the nature of tenures, and many other unavoidable restraints; it could
proceed alone from the corruption of particular men, who threw themselves
into a voluntary dependency.
Id.
Cf PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1,
at 141 (Tench Coxe writing that the independence of the Senate from the executive
would better ensure impartiality in cases of impeachment).
183 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
184 Id. at cl. 1; PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 1, at 144 (Tench Coxe).
185 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
138 (Tench Coxe); ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at
240 (Roger Sherman writing as "A Citizen of New Haven").
186 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 20
(Virginia plan outlining independent upper and lower chambers); 1 id. at 52, 69,
254 (James Wilson mentioning need for independence of Senate from House); 1
id. at 120, 490 (Madison mentioning need for an independent Senate); I id. at 136
(Dickinson stating need for an independent Senate); l id. at 152 (Gerry on the need
for the Senate to be independent of the House); 1 id. at 155 (Pinckney, same);
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 31
("[T]he expediency of dividing the powers of legislation between the two bodies
of men, whose debates shall be separate and not dependent on each other.... .
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executive was to be independent of the legislature, and this the new federal
Constitution prescribed this even more thoroughly than most state
constitutions." 7 For example, the President's election largely bypassed
Congress, 8 8 so he was not "tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complai-
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 322 (James Madison) (stating, "In
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The
remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches;
and to render them, by different modes of election and different principles of
action, as little connected with each other as the nature of their common functions
and their common dependence on the society will admit."). See also id. No. 65, at
398 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing, "Where else than in the Senate could have
been found a tribunal [to try impeachments] sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently
independent?").
.See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 26-27 (Theophilus Parsons speaking at the
Massachusetts ratifring convention); ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note
1, at 227 (Roger Sherman, writing as "A Countryman," stating that "the two houses
should be completely independent of each other."); id. at 273-74 (George Clinton
writing as "Cato").
1987 James Wilson, for example, averred that while the Constitution did not
maintain strict separation among legislative, executive, and judicial powers, such
separation "is more strictly adhered to than in any other system of government in
the world.' 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 504.
On the desirability of executive independence, see also 3 ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 275 (William Grayson speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 66, 176
(Edmund Randolph); I id. at 290 (Hamilton); 2 id. at 31, 52, 64-65, 527 (Gouver-
neur Morris); 2 id. at 32 (Hugh Williamson); 2 id. at 33, 36 (James McClurg); 2 id.
at 66 (Charles Pinkney); 2 id. at 66-67 (Rufus King); 2 id. at 102 (Elbridge Gerry);
2 id. at 109 (Madison); 2 id. at 524 (Hugh Williamson); PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 225-26 (Alexander Contee
Hanson writing as "Aristides").
Perhaps the most independent state governor was that of Massachusetts, whose
then-existing constitution was based on a draft by John Adams. FERLING, supra
note 1, at 214-15.
At the Massachusetts ratifying convention James Bowdoin cited this independ-
ence as a virtue. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 128.
Roger Sherman was an extremely rare dissenter from this principle. I THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 68. However, he
may have changed his views later. 2 id. at 499.
181 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 304 (C.C. Pinckney speaking in the South
Carolina ratifying convention); THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 1, at 413
(Alexander Hamilton) (writing, "Another and no less important desideratum was
that the executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the
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sance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official
consequence.".' Finally, of course, everyone agreed that the judiciary
needed to be independent of all other branches.190
Although the existing state constitutions and the Articles of Confedera-
tion featured less independence among branches than did the new
Constitution, almost all the Anti-Federalist writers endorsed the principle
of independence of co-ordinate branches. 9' In fact, one of their favorite
people themselves."); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 1, at 134 ("Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch at least
of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free Govt. and
that this mode under proper regulations had the additional advantage of securing
better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State
Governments in the General one."); 2 id. at 500 (Gouvemeur Morris); 2 id. at 501-
02, 523 (James Wilson); 2 id. at 522 (Elbridge Gerry).
I THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 1, at 413 (Alexander 1-amilton). See
also id. No. 71, at 433 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing, "[I]t is certainly desirable
that the executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor
and decision."). Part of that "duty" was protection of the public liberties. 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 67 (Rufus King).
190 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 480-81, 491 (James Wilson speaking at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-
66 (Alexander Hamilton); id., No. 79, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton); 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 429 (James
Wilson & Edmund Randolph).
See also 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 71 (John Steele speaking at the North
Carolina ratifying convention); 3 id. at 205, 468 (Edmund Randolph speaking at
the Virginia ratifying convention); 3 id. at 303 (Edmund Pendleton speaking at the
same convention); 3 id. at 539, 541 (Patrick Henry speaking at the same conven-
tion); 3 id. at 552 (John Marshall speaking at the same convention); 3 id. at 563-64
(William Grayson speaking at the same convention); 3 id. at 580-81 (George
Nicholas speaking at the same convention); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 27 (Madison criticizing state judiciaries as
too dependent on state legislatures); SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 35
("Philodemos" claiming independence ofjudges as a virtue of the Constitution).
19' See, e.g., Brutus No. 17, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 44
(supporting independence ofjudges); The Federal Farmer No. 3, in STORING, supra
note 1, at 47. See also 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 118 (Samuel Spencer at the North
Carolina ratifying convention); The Federal Farmer Nos. 76-77, THE
ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1; ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788,
supra note 1, at 273-75 (George Clinton writing as "Cato"); 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 298 (John Francis Mercer);
2 id. at 537 (George Mason). See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 550-51 (proposed
amendment in Maryland ratifying convention in part to further judicial independ-
ence).
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arguments was that the proposed Constitution did not guarantee enough
independence among co-ordinate branches. Illustrative is "The Federal
Farmer's" fear that:
[T]his sextennial senate.., will not in practice be found to be a body to
advise, but to order and dictate in fact; and the president will be a mere
prim us inter pares.... By giving the senate, directly or indirectly, an
undue influence over the representatives, and the improper means of
fettering, embarrassing, or controlling the president or executive, we give
the government in the very outset a fatal and pernicious tendency to...
aristocracy.
192
Anti-Federalist concern about insufficient independence was one
reason many of them advocated changes to ensure "rotation in office"-i.e.,
But see Centinel, Letter No. 1, in STORING, supra note 1, at 15-16 (favoring a
simple government rather than a complex one with mutually balancing branches).
1 The Federal Farmer Nos. 76-77, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note
1. For other Anti-Federalist claims of insufficient independence, see Centinel,
Letter No. 1, in STORING, supra note 1, at 19 (opposing inter-branch independence,
but stating that even if it is a good idea, the Constitution violates the principle); The
Federal Farmer No. 3, in id. at 46-47 (decrying improper blending of powers of
Senate and President); Brutus No. 16, in id. at 190-91 (same); The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their
Constituents, id. at 218. See also 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 118 (Samuel Spencer
speaking at the North Carolina ratifying convention); 3 id. at 57 (Patrick Henry
speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 9 (Elbridge Gerry as "A Columbian
Patriot" decrying the blending of the executive and the legislative functions.); id.
at 103 (Melancton Smith objecting to blending of powers in Senate); 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 537 (George
Mason, same).
See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 514 (James Wilson responding to
unrecorded Anti-Federalist charge of insufficient judicial independence at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention.); 2 id. at 539 (Mr. M'Kean responding to the
same); 3 id. at 539 (Patrick Henry at the Virginia ratifying convention on judicial
independence); 3 id. at 563-64 (William Grayson at the same convention on the
same topic).
Some might read Brutus Nos. 15-16, supra, as opposing judicial independence,
but this is not quite accurate. Those papers show that his disagreements with the
proposed system were (1) excessive independence of the judiciary from the people
by the use of English-style devices useful for independence in that country but
excessive in American conditions, (2) judicial superiority to the legislature and
states, resulting in both becoming dependent on the judiciary.
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term limits. 193 One way to get a sense of the closeness of the Anti-Federal-
ists to the Federalists on this principle is to compare the Anti-Federalist
advocacy of "rotation" with the similar discussion early in the federal
Convention, when the delegates considered limiting the President to a
single, long term to better ensure his independence from Congress.'94
As evidence of insufficient independence among federal branches, the
Anti-Federalists pointed to the proposed Constitution's frequent disregard
for separation of powers.'95 There was no concealing the fact that Federal-
ists blurred legislative, executive, and judicial functions, and the Federalists
admitted it.' In doing so, however, they created a political problem for
themselves. They departed from the dictum of the universally admired sage,
the "celebrated Montesquieu,"'97 that separation was a necessary protection
193 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 112
(George Mason). Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 72, supra note 1, at 440 (Alexander
Hamilton) (writing, "What are the advantages [of rotation] promised to counterbal-
ance these disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st, greater independence in
the magistrate; 2d, greater security to the people.").
The Federalists disagreed on the merits. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 113 (Gouvemeur Morris).
94 4 ELLIOT, supra note I, at 103 (William Davie reporting on the federal
convention debate to the North Carolina ratifying convention and stating that his
view at that time-that re-election would lead to excessive dependence-had been
in the minority.); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 1, at 21 (Virginia Plan); 2 id. at 54 (Edmund Randolph speaking on
ineligibility for re-election as a way to keep the executive independent); 2 id. at 57
(Elbridge Gerry and John Rutledge speaking on same).
'9 E.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 298-99 (Richard Henry Lee writing as "Federal Farmer"); id. at 330 (George
Mason criticizing the mixture of powers in the vice-president).
'96 Thus, Hamilton said at the New York ratifying convention, "The legislative
authority is lodged in three distinct branches, properly balanced [i.e., House,
Senate, and President]; the executive is divided between two branches [i.e.,
President and Senate]." 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 348 (emphasis omitted).
So coronated repeatedly in the public debate of 1787-1789. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 1, at 301 (James Madison); id. NO. 78, at 466
(Alexander Hamilton); Brutus No. 54, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note
1, at 154. See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 352 (Hamilton speaking at the New
York ratifying convention); 3 id. at 84 (Edmund Randolph at Virginia ratifying
convention); 3 id. at 247 (George Nicholas at the same convention); Centinel, in
STORING, supra note 1, at 16; The Address and Reasons ofDissent of the Minority
of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in id. at 212, 217.
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against tyranny. 9 ' The weight of Montesquieu's prestige lent gravity to the
Anti-Federalist charge.
After some initial confusion, 99 James Madison decided to respond by
taking on Montesquieu directly. Madison pointed out that the state
constitutions frequently violated the maxim of separation.20 "[A] mere
demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several
departments," he said, "is not a sufficient guard against those encroach-
ments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of
government in the same hands."' ' On the contrary, the system must give
"to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. 2 °2
The '"constitutional means" required that each branch exercise fragments
of the others' functions. For example, the President would enjoy a
201 h eaqualified legislative veto. The Senate would review executive appoint-
'"See 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 1, at 182-83.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because
apprehensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and executive. Were itjoined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge
would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same
body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers,
that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying
the causes of individuals.
Id.
'99 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1,
at 34.
200 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 1, at 303-04 (James Madison) (stating,
"If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find that, notwithstand-
ing the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in which this
axiom [of separation] has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which
the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct.").
See also 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 121 (William Davie speaking at the North
Carolina ratifying convention).
201 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 1, at 313 (James Madison).
202 Id. No. 51, supra note 1, at 321-22 (James Madison).
203 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 128 (James Bowdoin speaking at the Massachu-
setts ratifying convention); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 1, at 98 (James Wilson on the executive veto as a tool of self-defense);
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ments. " The judiciary could invalidate unconstitutional laws. 20 This
would not lead to tyranny, as Montesquieu feared, for no branch could fully
exercise any power without the consent of at least one other branch. Thus,
when James Wilson conceded that the Constitution mixed executive and
legislative (and, he might have added, judicial) powers in the Senate, he
noted that "[i]n its legislative character, [the Senate] can effect no purpose
without the co-operation of the house of representatives: and in its
executive character, it can accomplish no object, without the concurrence
of the president. 20 6
Indeed, the Founders proved more sophisticated than Montesquieu.
Montesquieu touted the value of separation in preventing tyranny, while,
for reasons discussed below," 7 the Founders recognized that the better tool
was inter-branch independence. Where separation would further independ-
ence, the Founders adopted it. Where blurring and checking would better
serve independence, the Founders chose to blur and check. The basic
principle of American balance of powers was not separation of the
functions of the branches, but their independence from each other.20 '
2 id. at 79 (Gouverneur Morris, same). But see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 74-75 (Elbridge Gerry, opposing this
approach).
204 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 122 (William Davie speaking at the North
Carolina ratifying convention).
205 THE FEDERALIST No. 16, supra note 1, at 117 (Alexander Hamilton)
(writing, "If the judges were not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they
would pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the supreme
law of the land, unconstitutional, and void."); 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 71 (John
Steele speaking at the North Carolina ratifying convention); 2 id. at 446, 489
(James Wilson speaking at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 id. at 540-4 i
(Patrick Henry speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 3 id. at 548 (Edmund
Pendleton speaking at the same convention).
206 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
158.
Cf Wilson at the federal convention:
The separation of the departments does not require that they should have
separate objects but that they should act separately [i.e., independ-
ently---ed.] tho' on the same objects. It is necessary that the two branches
of the Legislature should be separate and distinct, yet they are both to act
precisely on the same object.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 78.207 Supra Part II.C.2.
208 Cf Brian C. Murchison, The Concept of Independence in Public Law, 41
EMORY L.J. 961, 963 (1992) (illustrating the notion of independence amongst the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches as "a thread connecting separation of
powers cases").
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2. Why? Reasons for Independence Among Governmental Entities
One reason for the independence of governmental entities was to
ensure that each "had a will of its own" so that it could make unbiased
decisions using unimpaired judgment. Moreover, simply increasing the
number of individual decision makers led to better quality decisions, 29 and
separate, impartial deliberations by more than one branch would have the
same effect. 1 °
Perhaps the most important reason for the independence of governmen-
tal entities inter se was to render each of them more dependent on the
people. In order for a governmental entity to be fully dependent on the
people, it had to be free. from other, perhaps conflicting, incentives.21 '
When the people chose, mediately or immediately, several different
entities, each dependent on themselves, those entities, like individual
Recognizing the primacy of independence over separation resolves the
perplexity expressed by some authors as to the nature of the federal separation of
powers. See, e.g., Samuel W. Cooper, Note, Considering "Power" in Separation
of Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361, 362 (1994) (alleging that "the Founders lacked
a well-developed separation of powers theory").
209 Supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., 3 ADAMS, supra note 1, at 239-40, 501 (averring that government
with multiple branches is harder to corrupt than simple government); 3 ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 347 (James Madison at the Virginia ratifying convention
discussing the Constitutional requirement that two branches, President and Senate,
approve treaties); ESSAYS. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, supra note 1, at
240 (Roger Sherman, writing as "A Citizen of New Haven," stating that a purpose
of the Presidential veto was "to prevent laws from being passed without mature
deliberation").
211 See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
1, at 75 (Caleb Strong stating that involving judges in making the laws can impede
their impartiality in expounding them).
See also Commentator Steven N. Sherr's observation that:
In an ideal republican government, elected representatives express and
implement the people's will through legislative speech and activities.
However, an elected legislator's ability to perform these representative
functions depends largely upon her ability to speak freely and to make
independent choices. In short, republican government requires legislative
independence. It follows that constraints on independent legislative speech
or voting undermine the legislature's representative function.
Sherr, supra note 14, at 233.
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politicians, n 2 were encouraged to compete with each other for popular
favor.
Publius trumpeted the prospective advantages of competition between
the states and the federal government. This competition would help keep
the federal government within constitutional bounds, 3 prevent adoption
of measures "obnoxious to their constituents,"'214 and provide the American
212 See Reverend Samuel Stillman, at the Massachusetts ratifying convention:
In all governments where offices are elective, there ever has been, and there
ever will be, a competition of interests. They who are in office wish to keep
in, and they who are out, to get in; the probable consequences of which will
be, that they who are already in place will be attentive to the rights of the
people, because they know that they are dependent on them for a future
election, which can be secured by good behavior only. Besides, they who
are out of office will watch them who are in, with a most critical eye, in
order to discover and expose their malconduct, if guilty of any, that so they
may step into their places. Every gentleman knows the influence that a
desire to obtain a place, or the fear of losing it, hath on mankind. Mr. Borgh
tells us, that, towards the close of the seven years for which the representa-
tives are chosen in the British Parliament, they become exceedingly polite
to the people. Why? Because they know there is an approaching election
depending. This competition of interest, therefore, between those persons
who are in and those who are out of office, will ever form one important
check to the abuse of power in our representatives.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 167.
213 THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra note 1, at 172 (Alexander Hamilton)
(writing, "Independent of parties in the national legislature itself, as often as the
period of discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not only
vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of the citizens against
encroachments from the federal government, will constantly have their attention
awake to the conduct of the national rulers, and will be ready enough, if anything
improper appears, to sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE,
but, if necessary, the ARM of their discontent."). See also id. No. 28, at 181
(Alexander Hamilton); id. No. 46, at 297-98 (James Madison); PAMPHLETS ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 152 (Tench Coxe
discussing the role of state checks on the federal government as protecting the
public interest).
214 THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 1, at 300 (James Madison) (writing,
"Either the mode in which the federal government is to be constructed will render
it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it
will be restrained by that dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their
constituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the
people, and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the State
governments, who will be supported by the people.").
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people with mutual watchdogs. 5 The answer to the classic question, "Quis
custodiet ipsos custodes?"'216 would be "Custodes vero inter se ipsos.
' 217
Similar benefits could be expected from competition among branches of the
federal government. Competition would prevent usurpation2" and would
secure publicity for information that the people need to know (i.e.,
information as to the quality of executive appointments).1 9 Competition
215 Id. No. 52, supra note 1, at 330 (James Madison) (writing, "In the second
place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not
only be restrained by its dependence on its people, as other legislative bodies are,
but that it will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral
legislatures, which other legislative bodies are not."). See also id. No. 28, at 181
(Alexander Hamilton):
Projects of usurpation cannot be masked under pretenses so likely to escape
the penetration of select bodies of men [i.e., the state legislatures], as of the
people at large. The legislatures will have better means of information. They
can discover the danger at a distance; and possessing all the organs of civil
power and the confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular
plan of opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the
community. They can readily communicate with each other in the different
States, and unite their common forces for the protection of their common
liberty.
Id.
216 Who will guard the guardians themselves?
217 Indeed, the guardians will among themselves.
211 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 1, at 311 (James Madison).
219 See Hamilton's observations in THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 1, at
458, on the need for Senatorial approval of executive appointments:
The danger to his own reputation, and, in the case of an elective magistrate,
to his political existence, from betraying a spirit of favoritism or an
unbecoming pursuit of popularity to the observation of a body whose
opinion would have great weight in forming that of the public could not fail
to operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both
ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or lucrative
stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of coming from the
same State to which he particularly belonged, or of being in some way or
other personally allied to him, or of possessing the necessary insignificance
and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.
Id. See also 4 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 122 (William Davie at the North Carolina
ratifying convention stating, "The gentleman from Anson has said that the Senate
destroys the independence of the President, because they must confirm the
nomination of officers .... [But,] [t]he interest of each state will be equally
attended to in appointments, and the choice will be more judicious by the junction
of the Senate to the President."); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
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would improve the general quality of federal decisions.22 ° Of course,
competition requires that each entity have the tools necessary to protect
itself.
221
Competition also requires that competitors remain independent from
each other. Interdependence among putative competitors--cartelization
-- tends to direct competition, to the extent it survives at all, more toward
the protection of turf than toward the pursuit of popular favor. Speaking of
state-federal relations, Madison alluded to this point. He said that if the
federal government was too dependent on the states, then the states would
view an aggressive federal government as "encroaching, not on the people,
but on themselves '22 in other words, a mere turf war.
The foregoing explains why participants in the Constitutional debates
could claim simultaneously that the branches of the new federal govern-
ment would be both independent and dependent. 223 Each branch's
independence from the others promoted the dependence of each upon the
citizenry.
OF 1787, supra note 1, at 42-43 (Madison stating that approval of nominations by
at least a third of the Senate would provide security against "any incautious or
corrupt nomination by the Executive.").
220 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 348 (Hamilton at the New York ratifying
convention: "This organization is so complex, so skilfully [sic] contrived, that it is
next to impossible that an impolitic or wicked measure should pass the scrutiny
with success."); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 1, at 225 (Alexander Contee Hanson, writing as "Aristides," stating that the
need for several agencies to approve legislation will promote the public good).
221 Writing as "Aristides," Federalist Alexander Contee Hanson, remarked,
"The perfection of political science consists chiefly in providing mutual checks
amongst the several departments of power, preserving at the same time, the
dependance [sic] of the greatest upon the people." PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 222.
222 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 372 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion).
223 See, e.g., Rev. Thomas Thacher at the Massachusetts ratifying convention:
[The House and Senate] are a check on each other, and can never be
made either dependent on one another, or independent of the people. The
President is chosen by the electors, who are appointed by the people. The
high courts of justice arise from the President and Senate; but yet the
ministers of them can be removed only upon bad behavior. The independ-
ence of judges is one of the most favorable circumstances to public liberty
.... Thus it appears that all parts of this system arise ultimately from the
people, and are still independent of each other.
2 id. at 145. Cf. 2 id. at 200 (Richard Law, at the Connecticut ratifying convention,
stating that all branches will be dependent on the people).
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3. Qualifications on Independence Among Government Entities
The independence of governmental entities from each other was not
perfect. To the extent that the Founding Generation tolerated dependencies,
however, those dependencies followed a clear pattern: entities more remote
from the people relied on entities chosen more directly by the people far
more than vice-versa.224 The spectrum from less remote to more remote ran
from the states to the House of Representatives to the President and Senate
(approximately tied) and finally to the federal courts. The Constitution
clearly reflected this principle: The House and President were to depend on
the states for election procedures, 5 the Senate on the House to originate
revenue bills, 2 16 Senators on state legislatures for their appointment, 27 the
courts on the President and the Senate for their staffing228 and on the other
two federal branches for their salaries.229 In part, the dependence of greater
upon lesser appears to have been established to make the government more
democratic and, perhaps, to "even the playing field" for competition--that
is, to provide the more homey entities such as the states with more capacity
224 Cf 3 id. at 257 (Madison, at the Virginia ratifying convention, stating that
the federal government will depend on the states more than the states depend on the
federal government). See also THE FEDERALISTNo. 46, supra note 1, at 296 (James
Madison) (stating, "the members of the federal will be more dependent on the
members of the State governments than the latter will be on the former.").
225 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1, at 287 (James Madison); id. No. 45,
at 291 (James Madison); id. No. 46, at 296 (James Madison); 1 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 404 (Charles Pinckney).
226 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
2271d. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
22
1 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2291 d. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (appropriations).
For additional citations to Federalist resort to federal dependencies on the
states, see infra note 234.
The fact that the judiciary was somewhat dependent on the less remote branches
while they were not dependent on the judiciary helps to explain Hamilton's view
that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of
power; that it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks." THE
FEDERALISTNO. 78, supra note 1, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton). Anti-Federalist
William Grayson argued that the prospect of salary increases made the judiciary too
dependent on the other branches. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 563-64 (speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention).
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to defend themselves and the people against, the high-toned, remote
entities.230 Certainly David Hume suggested a similar role for a limited
amount of dependence in the British constitution.23'
The Anti-Federalists subscribed to this approach. In fact, they quarreled
with the proposed Constitution because they believed it did not fully carry
the principle far enough. For example, when James Monroe, the future
President and then an Anti-Federalist, demanded an explanation of the
clause forbidding either chamber of Congress from adjourning more than
three days without the consent of the other,232 his potential objection was
that this might render the House too dependent on the Senate; he expressed
no concern about the Senate depending on the House.
233
The pattern of relatively small levels of dependence of more remote
entities on less remote ones became a material part of the final political
bargain. During the ratification debates, Federalist speakers and writers
repeatedly referenced these small dependencies to show that the more
remote entities would not dominate those closer to the people.1
3 1
230 See, e.g., PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 1, at 152 (Tench Coxe discussing the role of federal dependencies on states
in enabling the states to better defend the people). Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 45,
supra note 1, at 291 (James Madison) (writing on the protection given the states by
these dependencies).
231 HUME, supra note 1, at 70 (arguing that the dependence of some members
of Parliament on the Crown was necessary for the Crown to protect itself against
the inherently stronger House of Commons).
232 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
233 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 367 (speaking at the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion).234 Richard Law speaking at the Connecticut ratifying convention:
Some suppose that the general government, which extends over the
whole, will annihilate the state governments. But consider that this general
government rests upon the state governments for its support. It is like a vast
and magnificent bridge, built upon thirteen strong and stately pillars. Now,
the rulers, who occupy the bridge, cannot be so beside themselves as to
knock away the pillars which support the whole fabric.
2 id. at 201. See also 2 id. at 202 (Oliver Wolcott stating at the same convention
that the Senate is dependent on states, the House on the people); 2 id. at 46 (Fisher
Ames speaking at the Massachusetts ratifying convention); 2 id. at 64 (Increase
Sumner speaking at the same convention); 2 id. at 91-92 (Theophilus Parsons
speaking at the same convention); 4 id. at 53 (James Iredell speaking at the North
Carolina convention); 4 id. at 59 (William Davie speaking at the same convention);
4 id. at 180-81 (MacLaine speaking at the same convention; this may be Archibald
or William MacLaine; the transcripts do not state with certainty.); 2 id. at 353
(Hamilton speaking at the New York ratifying convention); 3 id. at 40 (Edmund
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D. The Apparent Independence of Government from the People
We have seen that the value of "independence," insofar as applicable
among governmental entities, was not inconsistent with--and indeed
existed to further--the values of sympathy and dependence on the
people.235 On the other hand, there is a good deal in the debates and in the
final document to suggest that the framers also sought a certain amount of
independence from the people. For example, participants in the debates
occasionally referred to the need for the more remote branches of govern-
ment to be independent from popular whims236 and to serve as forces of
"'stability."237 In the proposed Constitution itself, officials in each branch
Pendleton speaking at the Virginia ratifying convention); 3 id. at 96 (James
Madison speaking at the same convention); ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788,
supra note 1, at 153-54 (Oliver Ellsworth writing as "The Landholder");
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 159
(James Wilson making the same point in a speech delivered Oct. 6, 1787); THE
FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 1, at 287 (James Madison); id. NO. 45, at 291
(James Madison); id. No. 46, at 296 (James Madison).
Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith commented on the irony of the Federalists
simultaneously arguing that (1) the Senate would protect the states but (2) the
Senate should not be dependent on the states. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 312
(speaking at the New York ratifying convention).
235 Supra Part II.C.2.
236 See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 302 (Hamilton speaking at the New York
ratifying convention).
237 See, e.g., 3 id. at 279 (William Grayson discussing the Senate during the
Virginia ratifying convention; Grayson favored lifetime terms.); 2 id. at 309
(Melancton Smith, an Anti-Federalist, favorably discussing stability of the Senate
at the New York ratifying convention); 3 id. at 360 (William Nicholas at the
Virginia ratifying convention opposing recall of Senators on the ground that this
would "impair their independence and firmness."); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 141 (Tench Coxe stating that Senate
is more independent of the people than the House).
Note, however, that most of the references to the "independence" of the more
remote branches actually refer to independence from other branches, not to
independence from the people. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 196 (Oliver
Ellsworth speaking on independence of the judicial branch from the legislature);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 468-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (referring
both to judicial "independence" from Congress but also from popular lead-
ers-acknowledging, however, that the independence from the people is short-term
only); 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 86
(John Dickinson speaking on the need for independent legislative, executive, and
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were to be selected for fixed terms (or, in the case of the judiciary, during
good behavior) and were not subject to recall. Election of Senators and the
President was indirect rather than direct. Independence of this sort would
seem to conflict with the principle of sympathy.
Arguably, some constitutional tension exists. However, upon examina-
tion, one finds that it is much less than might be supposed. The apparent
independence of government actors served to restrict each of them to
defined roles--or, as the Founders would have said, discrete "offices"
(using "offices" in its common eighteenth century sense to mean functions
and responsibilities). 38 Each constitutional "office" was designed to reflect
a different aspect of popular sentiment. The various offices complemented
each other in a way that rendered government as a whole sympathetic to
and dependent on the full range of citizen preferences. It was as if each
office comprised an instrument in an orchestra whose sound was the
product of the whole.
It is a commonplace of modem polling that one often elicits alternative
answers according to how one asks a question. This is sometimes cited as
evidence of popular fatuity. In fairness, however, we must remember that
varying forms of a question may elicit differing answers because they either
incorporate different values or do not weigh common values uniformly.
Consider the question: Do you prefer to vote Democrat or Republican?
During the second half of the twentieth century, some commentators
marveled at an electorate that voted for Democratic Congresses but voted
just as consistently for Republican Presidents. 39 Then it was suggested that
this voting pattern was rational if one wanted a maximum share of available
pork for one's own locality (Democrat) while keeping the lid on the overall
size of the budget (Republican). The voters' answer (Republican or
Democrat) was different in each case because the form of the question was
different: general welfare or local welfare? 4 .
judicial branches).
" "Office" derives from the Latin term officium, which means a duty, as in "It
is the office of the President to resist foreign influences."
.39 Thus, for most of the terms of Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan, and
the elder Bush, all Republicans, both houses of Congress were in Democratic
hands. The split reversed during the Presidential term of Bill Clinton.
240 Cf 2 THE REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1,
at 52-53 (GouvemeurMorris speaking on the role of executive as guardian of the
interest of the whole people).
There are many other examples. My first academic appointment was in
Oklahoma, where at the time voters invariably installed a Democratic state
legislature, sometimes balanced it with a Republican governor, voted for a political
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In the British parliamentary system (at least before recent devolution),
the answers to national issues were simpler because voters faced only one
question: Do you want the Conservative Party, Liberal Democratic Party,
or Labour Party to represent you for the next five years? 24' But the
American Founding Generation constructed a system that regularly asked
the American electorate multiple questions: "What are your preferences for
state issues?" "What are your preferences for national issues?" "And as to
national issues, please state your preferences for legislative, executive, and
judicial approaches;" and "Specify your answers assuming time horizons
of two years, four years, six years, and for the rest of this generation (i.e.,
the remaining lifespan of a middle-aged man)." Such varying questions
often have varying answers. The selection of the distant and forbidding, yet
internationally respected, George Washington as our first President was in
perfect sympathy with American popular sentiment. One imagines that he
might have lost a local election to an affable ward heeler.242
Consider again the roles--"offices"--each federal branch was expected
to fill. The role of the House of Representatives was not merely to serve as
a legislative entity, but also to oversee ("check") the executive and judicial
branches through its powers to impeach and appropriate. In all of its
functions the House was a close, although not exact,243 substitute for the
popular assemblies of earlier republics244 because it injected into federal
mix at the Congressional level, but supported Republican presidential nominees
quite strongly.
Split-ticket voting also makes sense if the electorate believes it can benefit from
inter-party competition.
24 Or, in the eighteenth century: "Do you want Tories or Whigs to represent
you for the next seven years?"
22 Unless, perhaps, he applied his considerable wealth to win the post.
243 At least some Federalists acknowledged that representation for a two-year
term was not quite a perfect mirror of a popular assembly. At the Massachusetts
ratifying convention, Fisher Ames argued:
I consider biennial elections as a security that the sober, second thought of
the people shall be law. There is a calm review of public transactions, which
is made by the citizens who have families and children, the pledges of their
fidelity. To provide for popular liberty, we must take care that measures
shall not be adopted without due deliberation. The member chosen for two
years will feel some independence in his seat. The factions of the day will
expire before the end of his term.
2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 11.
24 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. The powers of those
assemblies were not entirely legislative, either. The Roman assemblies, for
example, had a number of executive and judicial duties. THE OXFORD CLASSICAL
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decision making the electorate's local and short-term attitudes and
interests.
The "office" of the President fits somewhere between Roman consul
and British king:245 both to administer the executive branch and to influence
the legislative process (by proposals to Congress and the veto), and the
judicial process (by appointments and approval ofjudicial appropriations).
In each of these functions, the President, with his national responsibilities
and four year term, would represent popular sentiments on wider, longer-
range questions than would the average representative. It was not that the
President was less sympathetic than the House of Representatives, but that
he was sympathetic to popular sentiments of a wider, longer-term
kind.246
Noah Webster, the lexicographer and Federalist, captured this point. In
the course of a pamphlet supporting the proposed Constitution, he
discussed the varying roles of popular assemblies, the House, and the
Senate in reflecting, respectively, immediate-term, short-term, and medium-
term preferences. Popular assemblies, he said, are subject to "passions,
easily inflamed, which may bias their reason. 247 Chambers elected for
short terms (from the context, he seems to mean three years or fewer) may
suffer similar disabilities. However, the same men who adopt an ill-advised
measure in the pressure of the moment think better of it after the fervor dies
down and they can take a longer-term view.248 Similarly, while the House
would reflect "local attachments," the longer terms of Senators would
induce them to "lose their partiality, generalize their views, and consider
DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 272.
245 Cf. PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
1, at 35-37 (Noah Webster).
246 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 80
(Madison). As Nicholas Collins said in defense of longer terms of office: "A
person who wants only a common dwelling house, does not change the master
workman every week." SHEEHAN & MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 50 (writing as "A
Foreign Spectator").
247 PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at
31.
248 Id. at 32 (stating how under the Articles of Confederation Congress later
became ashamed of a hastily-passed resolution and repealed it); id. at 33
(describing how, after the Connecticut senate blocked a foolish measure passed by
the lower house, "within two months, every representative was ashamed of the
conduct of the house"). Cf id. at 340 (James Iredell writing that, without checks,
"the government might be destroyed by a momentary impulse of passion, which the
very members who indulged it might for ever afterwards in vain deplore").
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themselves as acting for the whole confederacy." '249 To be sure, the Senate
still would represent the people rather than some "superior and independent
order of men."25 However, the aspect of popular opinion it reflected would
be the longer term, national part, and would bring to bear those views
before measures were adopted.25'
The "office" of the courts was to respond to the longest-term question
of all: "Do you favor the rule of law?" The courts would implement the
electorate's overwhelming affirmative answer, not merely by deciding
private cases, but by correcting the other two branches when they violated
the Constitution. Although as the Anti-Federalist writer Brutus observed,
the jury system would provide the courts with an element of sympathy for
popular short-term preferences,252 the lifetime tenure of judges gave them
the ability to fulfill long-term preferences by curbing short-term ones.253
The classical shorthand for the process is "strapping oneself to the mast." '254
249 d. at 40 (Noah Webster).
25 Id. at 35 (Noah Webster).
251 Id. at 340 (James Iredell).
252 Brutus No. 17, THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 1, at 44. See also
Federal Farmer No. 4, in STORING, supra note 1, at 58.3 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton), on the
judicial obligation to guard the Constitution:
Though I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur
with its enemies in questioning that fundamental principle of republican
government which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish the
established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent with their
happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this principle that the representa-
tives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold
of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the
existing Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of
those provisions ....
Id. Cf id. No. 81, supra note 1, at 486 (Alexander Hamilton) (writing that "State
judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little
independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.").
254 In the story of Homer's Odyssey, with which, of course, the Founding
Generation was very familiar, the sirens lured sailors to their death by inducing
them, through the beauty of their song, to drive their ships upon the rocks where
the sirens perched. Odysseus arranged to hear the song and still remain safe by
stuffing his crew's ears with wax, having them strap him to the mast, and telling
them if he should implore them to release him, to bind him yet more. Odysseus thus
achieved his longer-term preferences (hearing the song) by creating institutions that
denied his short-term preferences (approaching the sirens' rocks). See HOMER, THE
ODYSSEY 173-74 (T.E. Shaw trans., 1956).
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Most complicated of all "offices" would be that of the Senate. In
several respects its function was an intermediate one. Although the
Constitution placed it in the legislative branch, the Senate was to exercise
both executive255 and judicial functions. It was to approve executive and
judicial nominations, try impeachments, advise and consent on questions
of foreign affairs, and represent the state legislatures in federal councils.
256
Its unique point of view flowed from its mode of election and its term of
office. State legislatures selected Senators-but for fixed terms. Thus, the
Senate was halfway dependent on the states257 and halfway independent of
them.258 Its six year term and two year rotation would give it greater
"stability ' 259 than the House--that is, to cause it to sympathize with
medium-term, relatively wide preferences rather than with shorter-term,
local preferences.
255 Indeed, Hamilton said, "the executive is divided between two branches," i.e.,
the President and Senate. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 348 (speaking at the New York
ratifying convention).
256 At the federal convention, James Wilson expressed reservations over the
Senate's sprawling jurisdiction. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 1, at 522-23. This formed aprincipal basis for opposition among
Anti-Federalists.257 See, e.g., 2 id. at 290 (Pierce Butler contending for payment of Senators by
states). At one point James Madison said there would be "absolute dependence,"
but surely this was an overstatement. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 97 (speaking at the
Virginia ratifying convention).
2582 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 291
(Madison); 2 id. at 292 (Daniel Carroll and John Dickinson).
John Lansing, arguing for a recall amendment at the New York ratifying
convention captured some of the ambiguity of the Senate's position:
It is observed, that,one design of the Senate, as it is now organized, is to
form a counterpoise to the local prejudices which are incompatible with a
liberal view of national objects, and which commonly accompany the
representatives of a state. On the other hand, it is said, the amendment will
have a tendency to lessen the attachment of the senators to their constitu-
ents, and make them regardless of the public sentiments, by removing the
motive to virtue; that is, a continuation of honors and employments. This
reasoning seems to be calculated upon the idea of dependence on the state
governments, and a close connection between the interest of the several
states and that of their representatives. But this dependence, say the
gentlemen, is the very source of all those local prejudices which are so
unfavorable to good government ....
2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 300.
259 Many, if not most, Anti-Federalists agreed with this goal as well. See, e.g.,
2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 309 (Melancton Smith speaking at the New York
ratifying convention).
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We have seen that governmental entities were to be independent of
each other largely in order to render them more dependent upon the
people.2" Similarly, for an entity to respond faithfully to the popular
sentiments to which it was designed to respond required that it be
independent from other kinds of popular sentiment. The "office" of the
House of Representatives, for example, was to respond to short-term
popular feelings; monarchical, aristocratic, and long-term influences would
distract it from fulfilling that office. Accordingly, the House of Representa-
tives was to be elected frequently and kept mostly independent from the
states and from the more "monarchical" and "aristocratical" branches of
government.26' The President's sympathy was to be of a longer-term,
nationwide kind.262 Hence, his tenure was longer, and he was freed from
dependence on the popular branch.
As for the Senate, Alexander Hamilton, while speaking at the New
York ratifying convention, described its level of dependency in this way:
I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitute the government; yet
every state is not the government; every petty district is not the govern-
ment. Sir, in our state legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary
between the interests of counties: the same must happen, in the general
government, between states. In this, the few must yield to the many; or,
in other words, the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest....
to be dependent from day to day, and to have the idea perpetually present,
would be the source of numerous evils. Six years, sir, is a period short
enough for a proper degree of dependence.
263
260 See supra Part II.C.2.
261 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at
512-13 (Gouverneur Morris).
262 See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 488, which records the remarks of James
Monroe at the Virginia ratifying convention:
The President ought to act under the strongest impulses of rewards and
punishments, which are the strongest incentives to human actions. There are
two ways of securing this point. He ought to depend on the people of
America for his appointment and continuance in office; he ought also to be
responsible, in an equal degree, to all the states, and to be tried by
dispassionate judges; his responsibility ought further to be direct and
immediate. Let us consider, in the first place, then, how far he is dependent
on the people of America.
Id.
See also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1,
at 80 (Madison arguing that the President would "be considered as a national
officer, acting for and equally sympathising with every part of the U. States [sic].").
263 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 318-19 (additional emphases added). See also
Hamilton stating again:
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It was not that the Senate was to be independent in the sense of ignoring or
being out of sympathy with the people or the state legislatures. Its function
was to represent popular sentiments when the questions asked called for
compromise and for a longer time horizon than "from day to day."2"
It was in foreign affairs that the Senate was expected to exercise the
greatest independence. But this was fully consistent with sympathy
because, as David Hume had written:
In foreign politics the interest of the senate can scarcely ever be
divided from that of the people, and therefore it is fit to make the senate
absolute with regard to them; otherwise there could be no secrecy or
refined policy. Besides, without money no alliance can be executed, and
the senate is still sufficiently dependent.265
The point here is that on those relatively rare occasions when the
Founding Generation spoke of officeholders being "independent" of the
people, they meant independent of some popular attitudes so they could be
dependent on others, allowing them to serve as separate parts of a
sympathetic, dependent whole.
I. APPLICATION TO MODERN ISSUES
". this independency lost, our constitution is a dead letter, and we shall
be only in a worse condition by preserving the forms of it."--Lord
Bolingbroke2'6
In this Part, I discuss modem illustrations to show that, without
sufficient application of the principles of sympathy and independence, the
There are few positions more demonstrable than that there should be, in
every republic, some permanent body to correct the prejudices, check the
intemperate passions, and regulate the fluctuations, ofapopular assembly.
It is evident that a body instituted for these purposes must be so formed
as to exclude, as much as possible, from its own character, those
infirmities, and that mutability, which it is designed to remedy. It is,
therefore, necessary that it should be small, that it should hold its
authority during a considerable period, and that it should have such an
independence in the exercise of its powers, as will divest it, as much as
possible, of local prejudices.
2 id. at 301-02.
2642id. at 318.
26S HUME, supra note 1, at 154.
266 2 BOLINGBROKE, supra note 1, at 168.
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system works rather differently than intended. These illustrations involve
the size of the modem House of Representatives, modem inter-branch
relations, and citizen and state dependency on the federal government. The
last issue, insofar as it involves the current judicial interpretation of the
Constitution's so-called Spending Clause, is treated in somewhat more
depth than the others. As to all of these illustrations, however, I provide
only a summary view; others may want to offer more detailed treatment of
these and other examples.
A. Size of the House of Representatives
Given the size Of the current U.S. population, the Founders probably
would have viewed the'small size of the present House of Representatives
as "aristocratic" in nature. The value of sympathy dictates that the House
can perform its functions as a truly representative assembly only if its
numbers are large and its districts small. Federalists and Anti-Federalists
disagreed about how large and how small, but districts with a population
in the 30,000-40,000 range were considered "large. '267 In 1911, when the
size of the House was fixed at its current level of 435,268 the population of
the United States was about 92 million;269 there was approximately one
representative for every 212,000 people. As I write, the population is about
289 million,27° or about one representative for every 680,000 people.
Variations, however, can be wide. I live in a congressional district with a
population of nearly a million.27' Application of the principle of sympathy
suggests that an expansion is in order-if not as far as Melancton Smith's
267 The number of voters was much smaller than 30,000. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 57, supra note 1, at 354 (James Madison) (stating that, "The only difference
discoverable between the two cases is that each representative of the United States
will be elected by five or six thousand citizens; whilst in the individual States, the
election of a [state] representative is left to about as many hundreds."). See also
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 1, at 143
(Tench Coxe stating that each representative will be chosen by about 6000
electors).
20 Act of Aug. 8, 1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 13 & 14.
269 The 1910 Census counted a population of 92,228,496. The U.S. Census
Bureau, Table 16: Population 1790-1990, at http://www.census.gov/population/
censusdata/table-16.pdf. (Aug. 23, 1993).
270 See The U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov (last visited Dec. 3,
2002).
27 Montana is a single Congressional district, and in 2001 her population was
estimated at 904,433. U.S. Census Bureau, QuickFacts, at http://quickfacts.census.
gov/qfd/states/30000.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2002).
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example of excess-1000 members272-- then to somewhat larger than the
present number.273
B. Cooperative Inter-Branch Relations
Modem politicians regularly talk about different branches (e.g., states
and federal government, Congress and President) "working together," as if
that were a political virtue. The U.S. Supreme Court has commented
favorably on this approach.274 But the Founders likely would have
condemned much of this cooperation as cabal and intrigue,275 and
272 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 245 (at the New York ratifying convention).
273 Discussions with two former Montana members of Congress, Rick Hill, a
Republican, and Pat Williams, a Democrat, revealed disagreements about optimal
size. These disagreements resulted from a tension of values, but not values
particularly identifiable as Republican or Democrat. Mr. Hill suggested a reduction
to about 250 in order to improve deliberation. Interview with Rick Hill, Former
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (R.-Mont.), Helena, Montana (Oct.
16, 2001). Mr. Williams suggested an expansion to one representative for every
200,000 to 300,000 (to a House of around 1000), citing "sympathy" concerns.
Telephone Interview with Pat Williams, Former Member of the U.S. House of
Representatives (D.-Mont.) (Dec. 19, 2001).
Each former Congressman, however, acknowledged the competing values. Mr.
Williams said one effect of a larger House might be to institutionalize a leadership
committee of committee chairs (in effect, a nascent Parliamentary cabinet). He also
suggested that one could achieve additional sympathy by coupling a smaller
expansion with proportional representation (of the House only). Another option we
discussed was the addition of a third chamber, much larger than the other two but
only with powers to accept or reject legislation--analogous to some of the ancient
popular assemblies. Then the size of the House of Representatives could be
reduced to facilitate deliberation. The addition of a third chamber, of course, would
necessitate a constitutional amendment. Id.
274 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).
275 There are many uses of this "intriguing" word to describe what happens if
the branches. are insufficiently independent. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 175 (Elbridge Gerry); l id. at 263
(Edmund Randolph); 1 id. at 339 (George Mason); 1 id. at 376 (Pierce Butler); 1
id. at 380; 2 id. at 103 (James Wilson); 2 id. at 56 & 109 (Madison); 2 id. at 500
(Gouverneur Morris); PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 1, at 225-26 (Alexander Contee Hanson writing as "Aristides").
See also 2 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 512 (James Wilson speaking at the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 1, at 30 (James Wilson noting that the executive must be
independent so as to be able to stand between "intrigues & sinister views of the
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subversive of the Constitutional system. In the arena of domestic policy at
least, the Founders saw inter-branch cooperation and interdependency as
fonts of secrecy and faction.276 They believed that cabal and intrigue
encouraged governmental cartels-anti-competitive agreements-that
inhibited free and open competition among branches for popular favor.277
C. Citizen Financial Dependency on Government
Virtually all the participants in the Constitutional debates of 1787-1789
would have been repelled by the citizen dependency created by the modem
Representatives and the general liberties & interests of the people."). Cf SHEEHAN
& MCDOWELL, supra note 1, at 50 (Nicholas Collins as "A Foreign Spectator"
writing on the need to avoid "aristocratic collusion" between President and Senate).
If reports of the late Justice William 0. Douglas' relations with other officials
are right, then he might have been wise to heed the admonition of Gouverneur
Morris. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at
42 (judicial intrigues with other officials can impair impartiality).
276 See, e.g., Madison's comments dealing with the election of the President:
If it be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive
& Judiciary powers should be separately exercised; it is equally so that they
be independently exercised. There is the same & perhaps greater reason
why the Executive shd. [sic] be independent of the Legislature, than why
the Judiciary should: A coalition of the two former powers would be more
immediately & certainly dangerous to public liberty. It is essential then that
the appointment of the Executive should either be drawn from some source,
or held by some tenure, that will give him a free agency with regard to the
Legislature.... Certain it was that the appointment would be attended with
intrigues and contentions that ought not to be unnecessarily admitted.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 56. Cf
RAKOVE, supra note 1, at 268 (citing Founders' ideal of a President "free from the
habits of intrigue" that characterized legislative manipulations by British kings).
277 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. See also THE FEDERALIST No.
51, supra note 1, at 323 (James Madison) (writing, "In the compound republic of
America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and
separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will
be controlled by itself.").
You cannot control each other if you are too busy bolstering each other up. On
the other hand, the Founders probably would have been more comfortable with
another modem trend, the so-called "Reinventing Government" movement, which
seeks to improve public sector productivity by injecting entrepreneurial incentives,
particularly consumer-oriented competition, into the public sector. See generally
DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1993).
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welfare state. A very large portion of the voting population currently
consists of governmental dependents-not just welfare recipients, but
millions of others who receive regular sustenance from government. The
participants in the Constitutional debates would have maintained that many
(if not most) recipients of government largess are not really independent
voters, and that their judgment is clouded by their fear of losing their
benefits and by their hopes of increasing them.278 Indeed, the level of
dependence among the modem American electorate is so high, the
Founders might have questioned whether our government is an effectively-
functioning republic at all. They probably would have advocated either
restricting the franchise only to people who did not receive government
checks or, preferably, finding ways to reduce the level of dependency.
D. Massive Federal Land Ownership
Another reason for dependence on the central government-both of
citizens and of states-is the widespread federal ownership of land in the
western United States. The Founding Generation envisioned the federal
government owning, "Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other
needful Buildings" and having jurisdiction over the seat of government.279
Moreover, by treaty, Congress had acquired undeveloped lands pending the
settlement of those lands and their admission as states.280 But it is unlikely
that the Founding Generation envisioned federal ownership of huge tracts
within functioning states: for example, eighty-nine percent of Nevada,
sixty-two percent of Idaho, and nearly half of Wyoming.2 ' The resultant
278Supra Parts II.A and II.B.
279 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
280 Congress was given the power to regulate these territories as well. Id. art. IV,
§ 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States .... ).
28 Federal land makes up the following percentages of the areas of the Rocky
Mountain States:
Arizona ..................................... 44.7%
Colorado .................................... 36.3%
Idaho ................................ 62.2%
M ontana ..................................... 27.8%
New M exico .................................. 34.1%
N evada ...................................... 89.5%
Utah .......... .................... 64.2%
Wyoming ............................. 49.8%
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
dependencies are due in part to the large number of federal employees and
contractors among the electorates of the Rocky Mountain states. In
addition, those states' political and economic life is heavily dependent on
the details of federal land management: mining, forestry, grazing,
recreational use, introduction of wolves and grizzly bears, and the like.282
Policy made Within the executive branch unquestionably influences the
nature of an affected state's Congressional representation.
On its face, the Constitution is unclear as to whether land ownership on
such a scale is within federal enumerated powers. This would seem to be
an instance in which courts should apply underlying constitutional values
such as citizen and inter-entity independence to assist in resolving the
question. Although a few courts have addressed the constitutionality of
massive federal land ownership, they have not addressed the underlying
constitutional value of independence in reaching their decision.283
E. Federal Grants in Aid to the States Under the Spending Clause
To the Founders, the growing pattern of state dependency on the
federal government would have been subversive of the Constitutional order.
As we have seen, independence was a guiding principle for inter-govern-
U.S. Gen. Serv. Admin., Table No. 369. Total and Federally Owned Land, 1960
to 1994, and by State, 1994, in STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
(1997), available at www. census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-us/html.
282 Those living outside the affected states may have trouble understanding the
overwhelming federal presence in much of the West. To illustrate, I have before me
an article in one of Montana's leading papers-featuring a screaming full-front
page banner headline-reporting how a federal court room was jammed with a
standing-room-only crowd, intensely interested on whether the government's latest
salvage timber cut was going to proceed. The article, which consumes approxi-
mately forty-five column-inches, describes the battle pitting four environmental
groups trying to stop logging against the U.S. Forest Service, logging companies
and the workers whose jobs were at stake. Sherry Devlin, Public Packs Salvage
Timber Hearing, MISSOULIAN, Jan. 4, 2002, at Al.
Such battles are routine in the West; that the paper should have treated it in
such a conspicuous and lengthy fashion illustrates how dependent the citizens of
Rocky Mountain states are on otherwise-routine federal land management
decisions. The Founding Generation would have been horrified.
283 See United States v. Armstrong, 186 F.3d 1055 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding
federal regulation after state cession); United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d 638 (9th
Cir. 1988). Cf Russia v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 69 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1934)
(holding that the U.S. government is the nature of a corporation and may acquire
property).
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mental relations, but when dependency was inevitable, it was nearly always
the dependence of more remote entities (such as the federal government)
on less remote ones (such as the states)-not the reverse.2" Federal grants-
in-aid programs may be an even more important force for dependency than
federal land ownership, if only because grants-in-aid directly affect more
states than federal land ownership.285
Federal largess bestowed directly on state governments is now huge. In
the Montana state government's budget, for example, the accounts funded
from federal sources now exceed the total state general fund by nearly
eighteen percent.286 There is no question that this sort of financial flow
creates state dependency. The conditioning of federal aid on a federal
program virtually guarantees that the state will accept any program and
accede to any mandate that has money attached to it. In many or most
states, the announcement that federal aid comes attached to a particular
program or mandate virtually ends discussion of the advisability of the
program or mandate.
From the text of the Constitution, it is not at all clear that the federal
government is authorized to make grants-in-aid unless the purpose for the
grant (as in the case of roads) is specifically mentioned in Article I, Section
8. The proffered basis for other grants is the putative "Spending Clause:"
"The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States .... 287
Actually, however, this clause says nothing specific about spending
other than "to pay the Debts. 288 Some commentators doubt that it really is
a "spending" clause at all.289 The Supreme Court has construed it to mean
284 Supra Part II.C.3.
285 To the extent, of course, that federal land decisions affect the composition
and attitudes of western state Congressional delegations, those decisions also affect
all states, but indirectly.
26 All locally-generated funds not otherwise earmarked are included in the
general fund. In Montana, as in other states, the general fund historically has been
considered the most important component of the budget. For the 2003 biennium
(July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2003) the general fund amounts to $2.347 billion.
However, federal aid amounts to $2.767 billion. Telephone Interview with James
Standaert, Senior Fiscal Analyst, Legislative Fiscal Division, State of Montana
(Oct. 31, 2001).
287 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
288 id.
289 See generally Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (or the President's
Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on
Article I, Section 8, Clause I of the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L.
REv. 81 (1999).
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that its authorization of taxes, debt payment, and "providing" for the
general welfare implicitly authorizes appropriations outside the Article I,
Section 8 list of enumerated powers.2 9° Yet that conclusion was reached
without reference to the principles of sympathy and inter-branch independ-
ence undergirding the Constitution.29'
The Court has "recognized that in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point
at which 'pressure turns into compulsion,' 29 2 thus suggesting, but not
actually stating, that conditions on federal mandates might become
unconstitutional at that point. A more basic Constitutional problem,
however, is the compromise of inter-governmental independence, with or
without compulsion. The fact that states almost never turn down such
funding or refuse to comply with imposed conditions demonstrates the truth
of Founding-era observations such as "Those who pay are the masters of
those who are paid'2 93 and "Any branch of government that depends on the
will of another for supplies of money, must be in a state of subordinate
dependence . ,29" The fact that the receiving entity is the one closer to
the people (the states) means that such programs violate not only the
general rule of inter-entity independence, but also the limited qualification
that permits some dependence when the dependent branch is the more
remote from the people.
SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Those who spoke out publicly in the Founding Generation believed that
government should be "sympathetic" to the people: It should reflect their
opinions, attitudes, and sentiments. Each branch of government would
reproduce some, but not necessarily the same, aspects of popular sentiment.
They would be independent of each other and compete against each other
for popular favor. Cooperation among the branches was to be subordinated
to this competition. The Founders sought a government of competitive
trustees rather than a government of brokers. The result was to be an image
290 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
29 Butler, 297 U.S. at 1; Dole, 483 U.S. at 203.
292 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
590 (1937)).
293 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 1, at 373
(Hamilton).
294 3 ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 17 (Wilson Nicholas speaking at the Virginia
ratifying convention).
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not merely of the sentiments of any particular group, but of the whole; and
not merely of the short-, medium-, or long-term perspectives, but of a
balance among them.
I already have suggested that the various entities in the new constitu-
tional system were to perform analogously to the sections of an orchestra,
and the whole to the resultant symphony.2" To employ a more mechanical
simile, the new system was to be rather like the mirror of a huge reflecting
telescope, composed of smaller mirrors each with its own function, but
producing a total image accurate and true.296
The drafters of the Constitution did their best to incorporate into the
document these common principles, shared by Federalist and Anti-
Federalist alike. They created a variety of devices for doing so: numerosity
in the House of Representatives, legal identity of interest between governed
and governors, frequent elections, division and separation of power, mutual
checks, and independence of governmental entities from each other. To the
extent that the drafters did create inter-governmental dependencies, those
dependencies were chiefly of the more remote agencies relying on more
popular ones. Both sides of the debate applauded this approach. The Anti-
Federalists questioned only whether the drafters had gone far enough.
The values of sympathy and independence were not peripheral to the
Founding; they were to govern how the new system would work. One
reflection of the neglect of those values is that, in significant part, the
system has not worked as intended. Readers may decide for themselves
whether it is time to re-set the machinery anew.
295 Supra note 238 and accompanying text.
296 Another analogy: parts of a compound eye.
2002-2003]

